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THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND THE ROOTS OF




Long before substantive due process and equal protection ex-
tended constitutional rights to homosexuals under the Fourteenth
Amendment, in three landmark decisions by the Supreme Court of the
United States, First Amendment law was both a weapon and shield
in the expansion of LGBT rights. This Article examines constitutional
law and “gaylaw” from the perspective of its beginning, through case
studies of One, Inc. v. Olesen (1958),1 Sunshine Book Co. v. Summer-
field (1958),2 and Manual Enterprises, Inc. v. Day (1962).3 In protect-
ing free press rights of sexual minorities to use the U.S. mail for
mass communications, the Warren Court’s liberalization of obscenity
law and protections of free press rights for homosexuals allowed
LGBT Americans to develop identity, build communities, and seek
social justice during a particularly oppressive time in U.S. history.
INTRODUCTION
I. HISTORICAL CONTEXT
II. NARRATIVE CASE STUDIES
A. One, Inc. v. Olesen
B. Sunshine Book Co. v. Summerfield




This Article examines constitutional law and LGBT rights from
the perspective of its beginning, rooted in U.S. Supreme Court pre-
cedents from three cases in the early days of the Warren Court that
affirmed the free expression rights of sexual minorities.4 Each case
* Jason M. Shepard (PhD, University of Wisconsin–Madison), Professor and Chair,
Department of Communications, California State University, Fullerton.
1. 355 U.S. 371 (1958).
2. 355 U.S. 372 (1958).
3. 370 U.S. 478 (1962).
4. I use the acronym LGBT as the modern, inclusive term to identify lesbian, gay,
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involved the censorship of magazines depicting political and sexual
expression of homosexuals and nudists.5 In One, Inc. v. Olesen, the
Supreme Court in 1958 overturned the Los Angeles postmaster’s de-
cision to ban from the U.S. mail ONE Magazine, the first political and
news magazine in the United States, created by and for homosexuals.6
During the same term, in Sunshine Book Co. v. Summerfield, the
Supreme Court overturned the postmaster general’s decision to ban
two nudist culture magazines, Sunshine & Health and Sun Maga-
zine.7 Four years later, in Manual Enterprises, Inc. v. Day, the
Supreme Court struck down the postal ban of three “physique” mag-
azines featuring male bodybuilders, MANual, Trim, and Grecian
Guild Pictoral.8
Mass communication has been crucial in advancing social justice
for LGBT Americans, and the First Amendment has been an essential
tool.9 Like the black civil rights movement and the women’s liberation
movement, noted historian John D’Emilio argued that the gay rights
movement used many methods “to emancipate themselves from the
laws, the public policies, and the attitudes that have consigned them
bisexual and transgender individuals while using other terms in historical contexts of
particular eras.
5. See supra notes 1–3 and accompanying text.
6. 355 U.S. at 371; One, Inc. v. Olesen, 241 F.2d 773, 773 (9th Cir. 1957); History,
ONE ARCHIVES FOUNDATION, https://www.onearchives.org/about/history [https://perma.cc
/7SES-ZSW5].
7. 355 U.S. at 372; Sunshine Book Co. v. Summerfield, 249 F.2d 115, 115 (1957).
8. 370 U.S. at 478–80, 495.
9. On the role of mass communication in minority social justice movements, see
SUSAN HERBST, POLITICS AT THE MARGIN: HISTORICAL STUDIES OF PUBLIC EXPRESSION
OUTSIDE THE MAINSTREAM 1–4 (1994); LAUREN KESSLER, THE DISSIDENT PRESS: AL-
TERNATIVE JOURNALISM IN AMERICAN HISTORY 15–16 (1984); BOB OSTERTAG, PEOPLE’S
MOVEMENTS, PEOPLE’S PRESS: THE JOURNALISM OF SOCIAL JUSTICE MOVEMENTS 8–9
(2006); and RODGER STREITMATTER, VOICES OF REVOLUTION: THE DISSIDENT PRESS IN
AMERICA x (2001). On the role of mass communication in the LGBT rights movement, see
EDWARD ALWOOD, STRAIGHT NEWS: GAYS, LESBIANS, AND THE NEWS MEDIA 14–15 (1996);
CHRISTOPHER BRAM, EMINENT OUTLAWS: THE GAY WRITERS WHO CHANGED AMERICA ix
(2012); GAY PRESS, GAY POWER: THE GROWTH OF LGBT COMMUNITY NEWSPAPERS IN
AMERICA 11 (Tracy Baim ed., 2012); RODGER STREITMATTER, FROM “PERVERTS” TO “FAB
FIVE”: THE MEDIA’S CHANGING DEPICTION OF GAY MEN AND LESBIANS 1–2 (2009); and
RODGER STREITMATTER, UNSPEAKABLE: THE RISE OF THE GAY AND LESBIAN PRESS IN
AMERICA ix, xiv (1995). On the role of the First Amendment in the LGBT rights move-
ment, see CARLOS A. BALL, THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND LGBT EQUALITY: A CONTENTIOUS
HISTORY 1–2 (2017) [hereinafter BALL, THE FIRST AMENDMENT]; Brent Hunter Allen, The
First Amendment and Homosexual Expression: The Need for an Expanded Interpretation,
47 VAND. L. REV. 1073, 1104–05 (1994); Carlos A. Ball, Obscenity, Morality, and the First
Amendment: The First LGBT Rights Cases Before the Supreme Court, 28 COLUM. J.
GENDER & L. 229, 229–30 (2014) [hereinafter Ball, Obscenity]; David Cole & William N.
Eskridge, Jr., From Hand-Holding to Sodomy: First Amendment Protection of Homosexual
(Expressive) Conduct, 29 HARV. CIV. RTS.-CIV. LIBERTIES L. REV. 319, 321–24 (1994); and
Paul Siegel, Why Lesbians and Gay Men Need Traditional First Amendment Theory, in
FREEING THE FIRST AMENDMENT: CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES ON FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION
224–25 (David S. Allen & Robert Jensen eds., 1995).
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to an inferior position in society.”10 At each step of the way, law af-
fected social change, either by enhancing or limiting it. In the second
half of the nineteenth century and the first half of the twentieth cen-
tury, many individuals engaged in mass communications were ar-
rested and jailed for distributing information deemed violations of
community standards and public morality.11 Laws prohibiting commu-
nication and expression were used as a weapon to stop social change,
while challenges to those laws were tools to advance tolerance, lib-
erty, and equality.12 As First Amendment law expanded during this
period, LGBT citizens came out of the metaphorical “closet” and de-
fined themselves as an insular minority group in America.13
The use of obscenity law to censor subcultures has a long his-
tory in the United States.14 This Article shows how three Supreme
Court precedents concerning obscenity standards and public moral-
ity hastened the development of an American homophile subculture,
despite the censorial efforts of the dominant culture, authoritarian
10. JOHN D’EMILIO, SEXUAL POLITICS, SEXUAL COMMUNITIES: THE MAKING OF A HO-
MOSEXUAL MINORITY IN THE UNITED STATES, 1940–1970 1 (2d ed. 1983).
11. On how law punished expression in the late 1800s and early 1900s, see MARGARET
A. BLANCHARD, REVOLUTIONARY SPARKS: FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION IN MODERN AMERICA
14–15, 17, 38–39, 41 (1992); ZECHARIAH CHAFEE, JR., FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES
3 (1941); THOMAS EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 468–69 (1970);
CHRISTOPHER M. FINAN, FROM THE PALMER RAIDS TO THE PATRIOT ACT: A HISTORY OF THE
FIGHT FOR FREE SPEECH IN AMERICA x, 1–3, 6, 8–9, 11 (2007); HARRY KALVEN, JR., A
WORTHY TRADITION: FREEDOM OF SPEECH IN AMERICA 35 (1988); and DAVID M. RABBAN,
FREE SPEECH IN ITS FORGOTTEN YEARS, 1870–1920 28, 30 (1997).
12. BLANCHARD, supra note 11, at 489–91.
13. See BALL, THE FIRST AMENDMENT, supra note 9, at 92–94; D’EMILIO, supra note
10, at 235–36; WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DISHONORABLE PASSIONS: SODOMY LAWS IN
AMERICA, 1861–2003 137(2008); WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., GAYLAW: CHALLENGING THE
APARTHEID OF THE CLOSET 176, 180–82 (1999) [hereinafter ESKRIDGE, GAYLAW]; JOEY L.
MOGUL ET AL., QUEER (IN)JUSTICE: THE CRIMINALIZATION OF LGBT PEOPLE IN THE
UNITED STATES 72–79 (2011).
14. See generally WALTER BARNETT, SEXUAL FREEDOM AND THE CONSTITUTION 60
(1973); PAUL S. BOYER, PURITY IN PRINT: BOOK CENSORSHIP IN AMERICA FROM THE GILDED
AGE TO THE COMPUTER AGE (2002); CAROLYN BRONSTEIN, BATTLING PORNOGRAPHY: THE
AMERICAN FEMINIST ANTI-PORNOGRAPHY MOVEMENT, 1976–1986 178 (2011); MORRIS L.
ERNST & ALAN U. SCHWARTZ, CENSORSHIP: THE SEARCH FOR THE OBSCENE 18–21 (1964);
GORDON HAWKINS & FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, PORNOGRAPHY IN A FREE SOCIETY (1988);
HELEN LEFKOWITZ HOROWITZ, REREADING SEX: BATTLES OVER SEXUAL KNOWLEDGE AND
SUPPRESSION IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA 12–14 (2002); RICHARD H. KUH, FOOLISH
FIGLEAVES?: PORNOGRAPHY IN—AND OUT OF—COURT 17, 21–22 (1967); FELICE FLANERY
LEWIS, LITERATURE, OBSCENITY AND THE LAW 26 (1976); RICHARD S. RANDALL, FREEDOM
AND TABOO: PORNOGRAPHY AND THE POLITICS OF A SELF DIVIDED (1989); GEOFFREY R.
STONE, SEX AND THE CONSTITUTION: SEX, RELIGION, AND LAW FROM AMERICA’S ORIGINS TO
THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (2017); WHITNEY STRUB, OBSCENITY RULES: ROTH V. UNITED
STATES AND THE LONG STRUGGLE OVER SEXUAL EXPRESSION 10–13 (2013); AMY WERBEL,
LUST ON TRIAL: CENSORSHIP AND THE RISE OF AMERICAN OBSCENITY IN THE AGE OF
ANTHONY COMSTOCK (2018); LEIGH ANN WHEELER, HOW SEX BECAME A CIVIL LIBERTY 13
(2013); LINDA WILLIAMS, HARD CORE: POWER, PLEASURE, AND THE ‘FRENZY OF THE VISI-
BLE’ (1989).
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politicians, and aggressive law enforcement. The Article roots the One,
Inc., Sunshine Book Co., and Manual Enterprises, Inc. decisions in an
expanding jurisprudence of the First Amendment in the middle of
the twentieth century that opened communications networks to in-
dividuals, and in the process helped create new cultural communities.
While the so-called “sexual revolution” wouldn’t begin in earnest
until years later, this Article shows how these three First Amend-
ment precedents laid the foundation for expansion of civil rights and
liberties of LGBT Americans over the next three generations.15 This
study of the historical development of LGBT free speech and free press
protections also informs current legal controversies about the na-
ture of rights claims, the tools and methods of legal advocacy, and
the judicial treatment of claims.
The Article is structured into three parts. Part I examines rele-
vant historical context and legal doctrines of the 1950s era, including
the status of homosexuals in the era, the practices of postal censor-
ship, and the evolving judicial standards of obscenity law. Part II pre-
sents three narrative case studies of Supreme Court decisions in 1958
and 1962. Part III discusses the implications of these cases on the
subsequent development of legal doctrine and judicial philosophies.
I. HISTORICAL CONTEXT
In the middle of the twentieth century, the freedoms and liberties
that gays and lesbians now have at the beginning of the twenty-first
century would have been impossible to forecast. In the 1950s, homo-
sexuals faced great risk in seeking others like them. The 1969
Stonewall riots, long identified as the spark that lit the gay liberation
movement, were more than a decade away.16
As historian David K. Johnson demonstrates, the federal govern-
ment launched an unprecedented public crusade against homosexuals
in government employment beginning in the late 1940s and continu-
ing through the 1950s.17 The federal government investigated and
fired hundreds of employees for alleged homosexual orientation in
what has been described the “Lavender Scare.”18 At a Senate commit-
tee meeting in February 1950, a deputy undersecretary revealed that
ninety-one employees had been fired for moral turpitude.19 “Most of
these were homosexuals,” John Peurifoy testified, sparking foreboding
15. Rachel Hills, What Every Generation Gets Wrong About Sex, TIME (Dec. 4, 2014),
https://time.com/3611781/sexual-revolution-revisited [https://perma.cc/9CLH-L27L].
16. See MARTIN DUBERMAN, STONEWALL xv (1993).
17. DAVID K. JOHNSON, THE LAVENDER SCARE: THE COLD WAR PERSECUTION OF GAYS
AND LESBIANS IN THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 1, 3–5 (2004).
18. Id. at 1–3, 5, 18, 103–05.
19. Id. at 1–2, 7.
2020] CENSORSHIP IN THE EARLY HOMOPHILE ERA, 1958–1962 603
headlines, such as “Perverts Called Government Peril” and “Federal
Vigilance on Perverts Asked.”20 Wisconsin Senator Joseph McCarthy
and others quickly tied homosexuality and Communism as major sub-
versive threats to the United States, and by June of 1950 the full
Senate launched an investigation into the extent of the homosexual
problem.21 A December 1950 Senate report described how “one
homosexual can pollute a Government office” because of his “emo-
tional instability” and weak “moral fiber”.22 In April 1953, President
Eisenhower signed an executive order banning homosexuals from
working for the federal government.23
In Gaylaw: Challenging the Apartheid of the Closet, Professor
William N. Eskridge, Jr. describes the government’s efforts in the
1950s as an “anti-homosexual Kulturkampf,” in which the state en-
gaged in a multifaceted campaign to erase homosexuality, going so far
as to equate efforts from 1946 to 1961 against homosexuals in Amer-
ica as bearing an “eerie congruence” to those of Nazi Germany from
1933 to 1945.24 Local police during this period ramped up aggressive
patrols on cruising areas and bars, while lawmakers and prosecutors
expanded criminal law penalties and aggressively pursued prosecu-
tions for sodomy, lewd behavior, loitering in public restrooms and
parks, cross-dressing, and other related offenses.25 Local police de-
voted significant resources to vice squads to conduct stakeouts, strings
and raids on potential homosexuals.26 After analyzing available arrest
data from 1946 to 1961, Professor Eskridge concluded that as many
as one million Americans faced criminal penalties for same-sex
dancing, touching, kissing, and sex during this period.27 While the
criminal penalties could be severe, citizens often feared the ostra-
cism and job loss that could come with the publicity of the arrests.28
Some men outed by the public shaming were driven to suicide.29
Media coverage of homosexuals often portrayed “moral panics” that
demonized homosexuals as perverted, unacceptable for employment,
20. Id. at 17; Federal Vigilance on Perverts Asked, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 16, 1950), https://
timesmachine.nytimes.com/timesmachine/1950/12/16/87186828.html?pageNumber=3
[https://perma.cc/6E7N-FSFB]; Perverts Called Government Peril, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 19,
1950), https://timesmachine.nytimems.come/timesmachine/1950/04/19/86432041.html?
pageNumber=25 [https://perma.cc/6GW9-D2NF].
21. JOHNSON, supra note 17, at 1–3, 5, 18, 103–05.
22. Id. at 114, 116.
23. ESKRIDGE, GAYLAW, supra note 13, at 70.
24. Id. at 14.
25. Id. at 43–44, 61, 63.
26. Id. at 63.
27. Id. at 60.
28. Id. at 67.
29. See Suicide and Violence Prevention, CTRS. DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION,
https://www.cdc.gov/msmhealth/suicide-violence-prevention.htm [https://perma.cc/XD6G
-FRX6].
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readily blackmailed, emotionally unstable, immoral, inflicted with dis-
ease, obsessed with sex, dangerous to young boys, and threats to the
nation’s well-being.30 Locally, arrests of homosexuals occasionally
sparked media frenzies, characterized by bold headlines, dire warn-
ings from government officials, and demeaning language to describe
homosexuals.31
So, it was in this cultural, political, legal, and media context of
the 1950s that homophiles decided to form an organization and launch
a magazine—at a time when the Supreme Court was poised to begin
a revolution against a century of obscenity law that would help con-
nect gays and lesbians to a broader subculture for the first time.
Long before the telegraph, broadcast radio and television, and the
internet, the post office was an essential system for mass communi-
cation among American citizens.32 One of the government’s early tools
in censoring communication among and by homosexuals was the
regulation of the U.S. mail.
Censorship of the mail was not authorized by Congress in the
early days of the post office system.33 For the American colonies, the
postmaster general in England oversaw a postal system essential to
colonial communications and commerce, until the Continental Con-
gress created its own system that was the precursor to the U.S. Post
Office.34 President George Washington stressed the importance of the
Post Office by advocating for the expansion of post roads in rural
areas.35 By 1828, President Andrew Jackson said the Post Office was:
chiefly important as affording the means of diffusing knowledge.
It is to the body politic what the veins and arteries are to the
natural—conveying rapidly and regularly to the remotest parts
of the system correct information of the operations of the Gov-
ernment, and bringing back to it the wishes and feelings of the
people.36
Congress first considered a federal law regulating the content of
the U.S. mail in 1836, when President Andrew Jackson proposed a
30. ESKRIDGE, GAYLAW, supra note 13, at 39–40, 59–60, 64, 69.
31. Id. at 64–65, 67–68.
32. See WINIFRED GALLAGHER, HOW THE POST OFFICE CREATED AMERICA: A HISTORY
1, 5 (2016); RICHARD R. JOHN, SPREADING THE NEWS: THE AMERICAN POSTAL SYSTEM
FROM FRANKLIN TO MORSE vii (1995); Anuj C. Desai, The Transformation of Statutes into
Constitutional Law: How Early Post Office Policy Shaped Modern First Amendment
Doctrine, 58 HASTINGS L.J. 671–73, 676 (2007).
33. See DOROTHY GANFIELD FOWLER, UNMAILABLE: CONGRESS AND THE POST OFFICE
ix (1977).
34. Id. at 1–3.
35. Id. at 12.
36. Id. at 21.
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ban on anti-slavery advocacy, especially for “incendiary” materials be-
ing sent into southern states.37 Congress refused to pass a censorship
law, instead passing a law “prohibiting [anyone from] tampering with
anyone’s mail.”38 Soon, disputes arose between local postmasters
and the postmaster general over conflicts between federal law and
state laws, particularly those in the South that criminalized the
sending of “incendiary” materials that sought to undermine the sys-
tem of slavery.39 As an attempt to compromise, the Postmaster
General allowed localities to ban from the mail materials that were
unlawful to deliver under state law.40 During the Civil War, President
Lincoln ordered the stopping of all mail correspondence with the
Confederate states, and the Post Office denied mailing privileges to
newspapers deemed “traitorous” to the federal government.41 As the
war went on, the Post Office also banned newspapers that published
unauthorized military news, including troop movements.42
Separate from anti-slavery advocacy and wartime regulations,
by the mid-nineteenth century, growing attention about public
morality combined with the spread of mass-produced printed mater-
ials led to calls for new laws to punish overt expressions of sexuality.
The first statute prohibiting obscenity was already in place under
the Tariff Act passed by Congress in 1842, which authorized officials
to confiscate and destroy “obscene or immoral” materials entering
the country.43 During this period, much of early U.S. obscenity law
was based on precedent from England. The English Obscene Publi-
cations Act in 1857 made it a crime to sell materials that corrupted
morals or shocked decency.44 A subsequent court precedent in 1868,
Regina v. Hicklin, established a test for obscenity that would be
embraced by U.S. courts until 1957.45 The so-called “Hicklin” test
was “whether the tendency of the matter charged as obscenity . . .
is to deprave and corrupt those whose minds are open to immoral
influences, and into whose hands a publication of this sort may fall.”46
Congress in 1865 passed the first ban on obscenity in the U.S.
mail, after prompting from the Postmaster General, who said he
37. JAMES C. N. PAUL & MURRAY L. SCHWARTZ, FEDERAL CENSORSHIP: OBSCENITY IN
THE MAIL 7 (1961).
38. Id. at 8.
39. See id. at 7–8.
40. FOWLER, supra note 33, at 37–38.
41. Id. at 44–45.
42. Id. at 49.
43. PAUL & SCHWARTZ, supra note 37, at 12.
44. Id. at 12–13, 15.
45. See Harry Kalven, Jr., The Metaphysics of the Law of Obscenity, 1960 SUP. CT.
REV. 1, 3 (1960).
46. PAUL & SCHWARTZ, supra note 37, at 16.
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was concerned about “obscene books and pictures . . . sent to the
Army.”47 Congress made minor changes to the list of unmailable items
in the next few terms, including illegal lotteries, postcards with scur-
rilous epithets, poisons, glass, or explosive materials.48 In 1873,
thanks to the advocacy of a young Anthony Comstock, then lobbyist
for the New York YMCA’s Committee for the Suppression of Vice,
Congress expanded the law to declare that no “obscene, lewd, or las-
civious” publication may be transmitted in the mail, and any person
who knowingly mailed or received these materials were guilty of a
crime punishable by up to ten years in prison.49 The law also prohib-
ited the mailing of articles that dealt with the “prevention of concep-
tion or procuring of abortion” and “‘any article or thing intended . . . for
any indecent or immoral use or nature’ or any publication . . . about
such articles.”50 The 1873 law was known as the “Comstock Act,”51
and after its passage, the Post Office Department appointed Comstock
as a special agent.52 Congress continued to make minor changes to
the law as new issues arose.53
Beginning in the 1870s and continuing into the 1950s, the Post
Office operated a system of administrative censorship.54 The federal
courts generally upheld legal challenges.55 The Supreme Court
upheld Congress’ constitutional authority to regulate the mail first
in 1878 in Ex parte Jackson, a case involving a lottery advertise-
ment.56 The Supreme Court heard at least a dozen cases in the
1890s, including several obscenity cases, upholding the Post Office
Department’s decision in all but one of the cases.57 In the early twen-
tieth century, the Post Office expanded categories of unmailable
materials again, this time targeting anarchist and “un-American”
materials during the era of World War I.58 For example, in 1917,
Postmaster General Burleson banned about sixty newspapers for
advocating socialist causes.59 In 1921, the Supreme Court upheld the
mail ban of the Milwaukee Leader, under the Espionage Act passed
by Congress in 1917, which the Court ruled in Milwaukee Publishing
47. Id. at 17.
48. FOWLER, supra note 33, at 59–60.
49. PAUL & SCHWARTZ, supra note 37, at 18–19, 21–22, 24 (quotations omitted).
50. FOWLER, supra note 33, at 61–62.
51. PAUL & SCHWARTZ, supra note 37, at 24.
52. FOWLER, supra note 33, at 62.
53. Id. at 63–64.
54. PAUL & SCHWARTZ, supra note 37, at 28–29.
55. For early cases, see FOWLER, supra note 33, at 68–72.
56. 96 U.S. 727, 728, 736–37 (1878); see PAUL & SCHWARTZ, supra note 37, at 31.
57. FOWLER, supra note 33, at 73.
58. Id. at 109–12.
59. Id. at 113, 115.
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Co. v. Burleson did not violate the Constitution by prohibiting the
advocacy of law violations.60 Similar wartime concerns developed in
the 1940s over “subversive propaganda” materials, prompting Con-
gress to create the Office of Censorship in 1941 to review materials
entering and leaving the United States.61
While the courts initially gave the Post Office Department great
latitude in censoring the mail, courts occasionally questioned Post
Office Department procedures. For example, in the one notable 1946
case Hannegan v. Esquire, the Supreme Court rejected the Post Of-
fice’s denial of second-class mailing privileges to Esquire magazine.62
It wasn’t until the mid-1950s that the Supreme Court began to
more aggressively overturn Post Office Department censorship. This
period represented the early years of the “Warren Court,” a term
affixed to the sweeping period of 1953 to 1969, when former California
governor Earl Warren served as chief justice, appointed by Republi-
can President Dwight D. Eisenhower to replace Chief Justice Fred
Vinson.63 Among the Warren Court’s most significant legacies in-
clude racial desegregation;64 expansion of due process rights for
criminal defendants;65 and the development of the right to privacy.66
Obscenity law was another defining issue for the Warren Court.
Between 1957 and 1973, the Court defined and redefined the contours
of free expression for sexual communication in dozens of decisions.67
60. 255 U.S. 407, 408–10, 414, 416 (1921); see FOWLER, supra note 33, at 121.
61. FOWLER, supra note 33, at 146.
62. 327 U.S. 146, 148–49, 157–58 (1946).
63. Brian P. Smentkowski, Earl Warren: Chief Justice of the United States, ENCYC.
BRITANNICA (Nov. 10, 2019), https://www.britannica.com/biography/Earl-Warren [https://
perma.cc/8V93-8HT2]; The Warren Court, 1953–1969, S. CT. HISTORICAL SOC’Y, https://
supremecourthistory.org/timeline_court_warren.html [https://perma.cc/J93U-33JW].
64. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 2 (1967); Brown v. Bd. of Educ. of Topeka, 347
U.S. 483, 483 (1954).
65. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 436–37 (1966), Gideon v. Wainright, 372
U.S. 335, 335 (1963); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 643 (1961).
66. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 479, 485 (1965).
67. See RICHARD F. HIXSON, PORNOGRAPHY AND THE JUSTICES: THE SUPREME COURT
AND THE INTRACTABLE OBSCENITY PROBLEM 20 (1996); Rodney A. Grunes, Obscenity Law
and the Justices: Reversing Policy on the Supreme Court, 9 SETON HALL L. REV. 403, 403
(1978); Kalven, supra note 45, at 1, 7, 17; O. John Rogge, The High Court of Obscenity I,
41 U. COLO. L. REV. 1, 17–20 (1969); O. John Rogge, The High Court of Obscenity II, 41 U.
COLO. L. REV. 201, 211–13 (1969); Robert Rosenblum, The Judicial Politics of Obscenity,
3 PEPP. L. REV. 1, 1–7, 9–12, 23 (1976). For discussions about individual justice’s approaches
in individual cases, see SETH STERN & STEPHEN WERMIEL, JUSTICE BRENNAN: LIBERAL
CHAMPION 120, 122–25, 365–68 (2010); BOB WOODWARD & SCOTT ARMSTRONG, THE BRETH-
REN: INSIDE THE SUPREME COURT 231, 236–39 (1979); Daniel A. Farber & John E. Nowak,
Justice Harlan and the First Amendment, 2 CONST. COMMENT. 425, 426, 443–47, 452–54
(1985); Edward V. Heck, Justice Brennan and the Development of Obscenity Policy by the
Supreme Court, 18 CAL. W. L. REV. 410, 410–14, 417, 430 (1992).
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Justice Harlan reflected on the sheer quantity of obscenity cases in
1968, when he wrote in one decision, “[t]he subject of obscenity has
produced a variety of views among members of the Court unmatched
in any other course of constitutional adjudication.”68 Three years later,
Justice Harlan concluded that the “obscenity problem [is] almost
intractable.”69 Beginning with Justice Brennan’s new definition of
obscenity set forth in Roth v. United States in 1957,70 the justices on
the Warren Court wrestled with questions about the definition of
obscenity and the implications of various legal tests as the Court
narrowed the “obscenity” exception to works of so-called “hardcore
pornography,” or work that pandered to children or unwilling adults.71
A major shift occurred with transitions of the Court in the early
1970s, and Chief Justice Burger’s decision in Miller v. California in
1973 brought the Court’s regular obscenity reviews to an end.72
In Roth v. United States, and its companion case, Alberts v.
California, the Court for the first time ruled that obscenity “was
outside the protection intended for speech and press” under the First
and Fourteenth Amendments.73 Chief Justice Warren assigned the
decision to Justice Brennan, who joined the Court the year before.
Brennan’s decision drew at least the partial support of everyone but
Black and Douglas, the two “absolutists” on the Court who opposed
censorship and criminalization of sexual expression.74 In terms of
simple political labels, in 1957, the Court’s nine justices were de-
scribed as being split between four liberals—Earl Warren, William
Douglas, Hugo Black, and William Brennan—and four conserva-
tives—Felix Frankfurter, Harold Burton, John Marshall Harlan II,
and Tom Clark—with the newest justice, Charles Whittaker, as a
tiebreaker.75 The cases involved two booksellers. Roth was convicted
in federal court of mailing obscene circulars and books in violation
of the federal obscenity statute, while Albert was convicted by a
California state judge of violating the state’s obscenity law.76
In the majority opinion, Justice Brennan said that obscenity had
long been thought to be unprotected as free expression.77 “Although
this is the first time the question has been squarely presented to
68. HIXSON, supra note 67, at x.
69. Id. at ix.
70. 354 U.S. 476, 476, 479, 487, 489 (1957).
71. HIXSON, supra note 67, at 74–75.
72. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 15–16, 36–37 (1973).
73. Roth, 354 U.S. at 481, 483.
74. See id. at 508; HIXSON, supra note 67, at 48.
75. JOYCE MURDOCH & DEB PRICE, COURTING JUSTICE: GAY MEN AND LESBIANS V. THE
SUPREME COURT 46 (2001).
76. Roth, 354 U.S. at 480–81.
77. Id. at 459, 481.
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this Court, either under the First Amendment or under the Four-
teenth Amendment, expressions found in numerous opinions indicate
that this Court has always assumed that obscenity is not protected
by the freedoms of speech and press.”78 Justice Brennan wrote that
the guarantees of freedom of expression were not absolute in most
states at the time the Constitution was ratified, and state laws in-
cluded exceptions for libel, profanity and obscenity.79 The Court had
embraced that view in earlier precedents, including in Chaplinksy
v. New Hampshire, in which the Court said “[t]here are certain well-
defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the prevention and
punishment of which have never been thought to raise any Consti-
tutional problem.”80 In “determining that obscenity is not within the
area of constitutionally protected speech or press,” Brennan said “im-
plicit in the history of the First Amendment is the rejection of obscen-
ity as utterly without redeeming social importance.”81 Not all sexual
expression is unprotected as obscenity, Justice Brennan stressed.82
[S]ex and obscenity are not synonymous . . . The portrayal of sex,
e.g., in art, literature and scientific works, is not itself sufficient
reason to deny material the constitutional protection of freedom
of speech and press. Sex, a great and mysterious motive force in
human life, has indisputably been a subject of absorbing interest
to mankind through the ages; it is one of the vital problems of
human interest and public concern.83
For sexual expression to be obscene, Justice Brennan wrote, it
must meet the following test: “whether to the average person, apply-
ing contemporary community standards, the dominant theme of the
material taken as a whole appeals to prurient interest.”84
Two justices wrote concurrences.85 Chief Justice Warren con-
curred with the judgments but wanted a narrower decision simply
upholding the prosecutions and the laws under question.86 Justice
Harlan wrote a separate opinion, concurring in part and dissenting
in part.87 He was prescient in his critique, saying that the majority
opinion created a sweeping new rule for limits on free expression
78. Id. at 481.
79. Id. at 479, 482–83.
80. 315 U.S. 568, 571–72 (1942).
81. Roth, 354 U.S. at 479, 484–85.
82. See id. at 479, 487.
83. Id. at 487.
84. Id. at 489.
85. Id. at 494, 496.
86. Id. at 494–96 (Warren, J., concurring).
87. Roth, 354 U.S. at 496 (Harlan, J., concurring).
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that was vague and unpredictable.88 “The Court seems to assume
that ‘obscenity’ is a peculiar genus of ‘speech and press,’ which is as
distinct, recognizable, and classifiable as poison ivy is among other
plants,” Justice Harlan wrote.89 But because “those standards do not
readily lend themselves to generalized definitions, the constitutional
problem in the last analysis becomes one of particularized judgments
which appellate courts must make for themselves.”90 Harlan would
have upheld the judgment in Alberts, providing greater deference to
state law and state courts to regulate obscenity, and reversed the
judgment in Roth, saying federal censorship is a more serious con-
stitutional problem and requires greater scrutiny by the courts.91
Justice Douglas wrote a dissent, joined by Justice Black, saying
the majority opinion “gives the censor free range over a vast do-
main.”92 The decision would be the first of many in which the two
First Amendment “absolutists” criticized their brethren for violating
the principles of free expression in their attempt to create rules pro-
hibiting some sexual expression but not others.93 “When we sustain
these convictions, we make the legality of a publication turn on the
purity of thought which a book or tract instills in the mind of the
reader,” Justice Douglas wrote.94 “I do not think we can approve that
standard and be faithful to the command of the First Amendment.”95
Over the next decade, the justices aimed to clarify the meaning
of Roth in their review of lower court cases, but their decisions in
more than a dozen obscenity cases reflected the broader challenges
in regulating increasingly more sexually explicit communications.96
Changes in the Court’s makeup did little to substantively change
the balance among justices on the obscenity question.97
Justice Brennan again took the lead in significant doctrinal shifts
in 1964 when, in Jacobellis v. Ohio, the Court overturned the obscen-
ity prosecution of an Ohio theater manager.98 Brennan’s majority
decision made three major shifts. First, it cemented the Supreme
Court’s role in being the final arbiter in determining whether a
88. Id. at 496–97.
89. Id. at 497.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 500–08.
92. Id. at 508–09.
93. See HIXSON, supra note 67, at 48, 80.
94. Roth, 354 U.S. at 508.
95. Id.
96. See HIXSON, supra note 67, at 20.
97. Id. at 42 (noting Justice Potter Stewart replaced Justice Harold Burton in 1958,
Justice Byron White replaced Justice Charles Whittaker in 1962, and Justice Arthur
Goldberg replaced Justice Felix Frankfurter in 1962).
98. 378 U.S. 184, 185–87 (1964).
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particular book, magazine or film was obscene or not.99 While a
three-judge panel had found the film in question obscene, the Court
had an obligation to make its own independent judgment on the ques-
tion.100 “[I]n ‘obscenity’ cases as in all others involving rights derived
from the First Amendment guarantees of free expression, this Court
cannot avoid making an independent constitutional judgment on the
facts of the case as to whether the material involved is constitution-
ally protected,” Justice Brennan wrote.101 Second, Justice Brennan
in effect added a new requirement beyond the Roth holding by re-
quiring a work to be “utterly without redeeming social importance.”102
Justice Brennan stressed that “material dealing with sex that ad-
vocates ideas or that has literary or scientific or artistic value or any
other form of social importance,” cannot be found to be obscene.103
Third, Brennan clarified the “contemporary community standards”
analysis from Roth requires using a national standard, rather than
a local community’s standards.104 “It is, after all, a national Constitu-
tion we are expounding.”105 In reviewing the film in question, Justice
Brennan said the film had won numerous awards and had been
shown in one hundred cities in the United States without incident.106
An “explicit love scene” at the end of the film does not warrant the
entire film to be deemed obscene, Justice Brennan concluded.107
While six justices agreed to overturn the theater owner’s convic-
tion, Justice Brennan’s rationales did not generate full support of
his colleagues.108 Justices Black, Stewart, and Goldberg concurred
in the judgment but wrote separate opinions, while Justices Warren,
Clark, and Harlan dissented.109 Justice Stewart commented in his
concurrence about the “task of trying to define what may be indefin-
able,” saying his intent in obscenity cases is to limit prohibitions to
“hard-core pornography.”110 Notably, Justice Stewart wrote:
I shall not today attempt to further define the kinds of material
I understand to be embraced within that shorthand description;
and perhaps I could never succeed in intelligibly doing so. But I
99. Id. at 187–90.
100. Id. at 185–87, 189–90.
101. Id. at 190.
102. Id. at 191.
103. Id. at 191.
104. Jacobellis, 378 U.S. at 191–95.
105. Id. at 195.
106. Id. at 196.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 196–97, 199, 203.
109. Id.
110. Jacobellis, 378 U.S. at 197.
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know it when I see it, and the motion picture involved in this
case is not that.111
In dissent, Chief Justice Warren expressed reticence in Justice
Brennan’s extensions of the Roth test, and he would have provided
greater deference to the jury’s finding of obscenity in the case.112
Justice Harlan in his dissent emphasized his belief that states should
have more leeway to police obscenity than the federal government.113
Jacobellis was one of several decisions in the mid-1960s in
which the Court signaled even tougher standards for obscenity con-
victions. In Memoirs v. Massachusetts, the Court ruled that action-
able obscenity required three elements: “(a) the dominant theme
taken as a whole appeals to a prurient interest in sex; (b) the material
is patently offensive [to] contemporary community standards . . .
and (c) the material is utterly without redeeming social value.”114 In
1967, in Redrup v. New York,115 the Court reaffirmed that any mate-
rial not deemed to be obscene by a majority of justices would be
protected expression, leading a clerk of Justice White’s to recommend
“Reverse on Redrup” as shorthand for overturning obscenity convic-
tions.116 The Court used the Redrup approach to overturn thirty-one
obscenity convictions by per curium dismissals in the subsequent
five years.117 But the Court upheld convictions in other cases, leav-
ing continued confusion about the application of standards. In 1969,
the Court extended the right to privacy to a case of possession of ob-
scenity.118 In Stanley v. Georgia, the Court ruled that “mere private
possession of obscene matter cannot constitutionally be made a crime”
under the right to privacy rooted in the Court’s 1965 decision in
Griswold v. Connecticut.119 The Court in Stanley distinguished the
case from Roth and subsequent obscenity decisions, saying those
precedents largely dealt with the “regulation of commercial distri-
bution of obscene material[s].”120 “If the First Amendment means
anything, it means that a State has no business telling a man, sit-
ting alone in his own house, what books he may read or what films
he may watch,” Justice Marshall wrote for the majority.121
111. Id. (Stewart, J., concurring).
112. Id. at 202–03 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
113. Id. at 203–04 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
114. 383 U.S. 413, 418 (1966).
115. 386 U.S. 767, 767 (1967).
116. WOODWARD & ARMSTRONG, supra note 67, at 192–93.
117. Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 82 & n.8 (1973).
118. 394 U.S. 557, 568 (1969).
119. Id. at 559, 564 (citing Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482 (1965)).
120. Id. at 563–64.
121. Id. at 565.
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Following Stanley, the Court saw major changes in its makeup
over the next two terms with four appointments by President Richard
Nixon.122 Chief Justice Warren Burger replaced Chief Justice Earl
Warren in 1969.123 In 1970, Justice Harry Blackmun replaced Jus-
tice Abe Fortas, who only served four years on the Court.124 In 1972,
Justice Lewis Powell replaced Justice Black, and Justice William
Rehnquist replaced Justice John Marshall Harlan II.125 Both Black
and Harlan retired in the fall of 1971 in failing health and died soon
after.126 The justices in the first three years of the Burger Court
were equally fractured in its approaches to obscenity cases, but the
justices were growing tired of the number of obscenity cases they
were reviewing, in part because of the Court’s shifting standards and
its difficulties in defining obscenity.127 In a series of cases, Justice
Brennan and Chief Justice Burger volleyed to attract a majority for
their positions.128 Justice Brennan was ready to adopt a more per-
missive position, while Chief Justice Burger sought a more restric-
tive position.129
In Miller v. California in 1973, Chief Justice Burger found
success in stopping the “Reverse on Redrup” practice.130 The case
involved the unsolicited mailing of five brochures containing explicit
advertisements for pornographic books and films to a restaurant in
Newport Beach, California that were opened by the manager and
his mother.131 The manager complained to police, and prosecutors
charged the sender, Marvin Miller, under the state’s obscenity law.132
A jury convicted him.133 In reviewing what Chief Justice Burger
called the “somewhat tortured history of the Court’s obscenity deci-
sions,” he noted that “apart from the initial formulation in the Roth
case, no majority of the Court has at any given time been able to agree
on a standard to determine what constitutes obscene, pornographic
material subject to regulation under the States’ police power.”134
Chief Justice Burger had convinced Justices White, Blackmun, Powell,
122. See HIXSON, supra note 67, at 96–100.
123. Id. at 98.
124. Id. at 100.
125. Id.
126. MURDOCH & PRICE, supra note 75, at 161.
127. MICHAEL J. GRAETZ & LINDA GREENHOUSE, THE BURGER COURT AND THE RISE OF
THE JUDICIAL RIGHT 192–99 (2016).
128. WOODWARD & ARMSTRONG, supra note 67, at 192–204.
129. GRAETZ & GREENHOUSE, supra note 127, at 196–98.
130. 413 U.S. 15, 18 (1973).
131. Id.
132. Id. at 16, 18.
133. Id. at 15.
134. Id. at 20, 22.
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and Rehnquist to agree to a restatement of the obscenity test, re-
quiring the trier of fact to review:
(a) whether “the average person, applying contemporary commu-
nity standards” would find that the work, taken as a whole,
appeals to the prurient interest, (b) whether the work depicts or
describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically
defined by the applicable state law; and (c) whether the work,
taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or sci-
entific value.135
The majority rejected the “utterly without redeeming social
value test,” but added a requirement that the prohibited expression
“must be specifically defined by the applicable state law.”136 Chief
Justice Burger stressed that under the new test, “no one will be sub-
ject to prosecution for the sale or exposure of obscene materials unless
these materials depict or describe patently offensive ‘hard core’ sex-
ual conduct specifically defined by the regulating state law.”137 Justice
Douglas dissented as usual, as did Justice Brennan, joined by Justices
Stewart and Marshall.138
The Miller decision significantly reduced the number of obscen-
ity cases accepted by the Court, keeping intact the central holding
of Roth.139 Justice Brennan’s view—that the long road from Roth to
Miller left him convinced that censorship through obscenity law
should largely be abandoned—quick fell out of favor under the
Burger Court.140
The three cases discussed in detail below unfolded in the years
immediately following to the Roth ruling, at a time when the Supreme
Court was refining its approaches to and definitions in obscenity law.
II. NARRATIVE CASE STUDIES
A. One, Inc. v. Olesen
In 1950, Harry Hay launched the Mattachine Society, which
would become one of the first and most significant homophile rights
organizations in American history.141 Hay believed that homosexuals
135. Id. at 16, 24.
136. Miller, 413 U.S. at 24.
137. Id. at 27.
138. Id. at 16.
139. WOODWARD & ARMSTRONG, supra note 67, at 403.
140. STERN & WERMIEL, supra note 67, at 365–68.
141. D’EMILIO, supra note 10, at 58. On the founding of the Mattachine Society, see
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were an oppressed cultural minority and that an organization was
needed to 1) “unify homosexuals isolated from their own kind;” 2)
educate the homosexual and heterosexual populace; and 3) “provide
leadership to the whole mass of social deviates.”142 For much of 1951
and 1952, the Mattachine Society held secret meetings and discussion
groups in private homes, drawing men from fear and stigma into
rich discussions about history, culture, and society.143 A small but
dedicated following existed, and new members came each week.144
The group also extended itself into legal and political advocacy,
when in the spring of 1952, Hay and other Mattachine members
mobilized in support of friend Dale Jennings after he was arrested
for lewd and dissolute behavior.145 The group helped get Jennings a
lawyer and created a non-profit group called the Citizens’ Commit-
tee to Outlaw Entrapment to raise money and draw attention to the
trial and similar police arrests.146 With Mattachine’s help, Jennings
received national attention when a jury deadlocked and the case
was dismissed.147 Jennings had admitted his homosexuality, but
accused the police of lying and entrapment.148 It was Mattachine’s
first legal victory, and it invigorated all those that were involved.149
Despite the Jennings victory, by late 1952, fissures began to
erupt inside Mattachine.150 A growing philosophical divide occurred
between Hay’s cultural model of homosexuality and Jenning’s
libertarian model of sexual freedom and privacy.151 Also, members
also VERN L. BULLOUGH, BEFORE STONEWALL: ACTIVISTS FOR GAY AND LESBIAN RIGHTS
IN HISTORICAL CONTEXT 77–80 (2002); LILLIAN FADERMAN & STUART TIMMONS, GAY L.A.:
A HISTORY OF SEXUAL OUTLAWS, POWER POLITICS, AND LIPSTICK LESBIANS 110–13 (2006);
HARRY HAY, RADICALLY GAY: GAY LIBERATION IN THE WORDS OF ITS FOUNDER 3–4 (1996);
JIM KEPNER, ROUGH NEWS—DARING VIEWS: 1950S PIONEER GAY PRESS JOURNALISM 3
(1998); CRAIG M. LOFTIN, LETTERS TO ONE: GAY AND LESBIAN VOICES FROM THE 1950S AND
1960S 2 (2012); CRAIG M. LOFTIN, MASKED VOICES: GAY MEN AND LESBIANS IN COLD WAR
AMERICA 19 (2012) [hereinafter LOFTIN, MASKED VOICES]; MARTIN MEEKER, CONTACTS
DESIRED: GAY AND LESBIAN COMMUNICATIONS AND COMMUNITY, 1940S–1970S 37–39 (2006);
JAMES T. SEARS, BEHIND THE MASK OF THE MATTACHINE: THE HAL CALL CHRONICLES AND
THE EARLY MOVEMENT FOR HOMOSEXUAL EMANCIPATION 147–55 (2006); STUART TIMMONS,
THE TROUBLE WITH HARRY HAY: FOUNDER OF THE MODERN GAY MOVEMENT 142–56
(1990); C. TODD WHITE, PRE-GAY LA: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF THE MOVEMENT FOR HOMO-
SEXUAL RIGHTS 16–19 (2009).
142. WHITE, supra note 141, at 17–18.
143. D’EMILIO, supra note 10, at 64–69.
144. Id. at 67–68.
145. Id. at 70–71.
146. Id.; see also LILLIAN FADERMAN, THE GAY REVOLUTION: THE STORY OF THE
STRUGGLE 64–65 (2015).
147. D’EMILIO, supra note 10, at 71; FADERMAN, supra note 146, at 65.
148. D’EMILIO, supra note 10, at 70–71; FADERMAN, supra note 146, at 65.
149. D’EMILIO, supra note 10, at 71; FADERMAN, supra note 146, at 65.
150. D’EMILIO, supra note 10, at 76–87.
151. WHITE, supra note 141, at 28–29.
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were growing frustrated by the secrecy of the cell-like structure and
potential Communist ties by Mattachine leaders.152 A particularly
damning article in the Los Angeles Mirror in March 1953, by jour-
nalist Paul Coates, alleged that as many as 200,000 homosexuals in
the Los Angeles area could be building alliances with other subver-
sive groups, creating a potentially “dangerous political weapon.”153
Mattachine members demanded that explicit connections between
the Communist Party be severed.154 In conventions in the spring and
fall of 1953, the membership did just that, ousting Hay and other
founding members.155
The idea of a homosexual magazine came from one of the
Mattachine discussion groups.156 On October 15, 1952, members
hatched the idea at the home of Dorr Legg,157 who would go on to serve
as ONE’s business manager for its entire corporate life and would
become the first homosexual to receive a salary for his advocacy
work.158 Over the next weeks, a small group of men—including Legg,
Jennings, Rowland, as well as Martin Block and Don Slater—
discussed their plans for content and production, met with a lawyer,
and settled on the name ONE, based on a passage from a Thomas
Carlyle essay: “Of a truth, men are mystically united: a mystic bond
of brotherhood makes all men one.”159
Because of its broad national reach and high visibility, along
with an unprecedented stability of fourteen years of publication
from 1953–1967, ONE Magazine became the voice of the homophile
movement of the 1950s and 1960s.160 Legg ran the day to day opera-
tions for almost the entire 14 years of the magazine’s existence.161
The magazine published monthly for most of its 14 years, although
its schedule was occasionally interrupted because of financial prob-
lems.162 ONE averaged a monthly circulation of between 3,000 to
5,000 issues.163 In the beginning, the magazine was available in only
a handful of bookstores and newsstands, and the rest of the reader-
ship was through subscriptions.164 Over time, the list of newstands
152. D’EMILIO, supra note 10, at 75–76.
153. Id. at 76.
154. Id. at 75–80.
155. Id. at 79–80; FADERMAN, supra note 146, at 71–72.
156. D’EMILIO, supra note 10, at 72–73.
157. WHITE, supra note 141, at 29–30.
158. D’EMILIO, supra note 10, at 87–88; LOFTIN, MASKED VOICES, supra note 141, at 21.
159. See BULLOUGH, supra note 141, at 88; SEARS, supra note 141, at 166–67; WHITE,
supra note 141, at 34.
160. LOFTIN, MASKED VOICES, supra note 141, at 17–20, 41.
161. Id. at 21.
162. See id. at 34, 38.
163. Id. at 20.
164. Id.
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and bookstores expanded, and the editors advertised friendly ven-
dors on the back page of each issue.165 ONE Magazine’s passionate
and trailblazing editors and writers addressed a wide range of psy-
chological, political, legal, historical and medical issues, contribut-
ing a public discussion of homosexual issues from the homosexual
viewpoint—something never before done in the United States. The
magazine helped develop a sense of gay identity and community
among its disparate readers, many of whom articulated the fear and
excitement it took just to buy or subscribe to ONE. The magazine’s
stated aim was to deal “primarily with homosexuality from the sci-
entific, historical, and critical point of view.”166 Each issue contained
essays, news articles and briefs, organizational reports, fiction, poetry,
book excerpts, reviews, letters, speeches, and advertisements.167
Common themes were identity, love, subculture, social prejudice,
police harassment, discrimination, civil rights and liberties, medical
and psychological views, social movements, history, literature, and
international issues.168 The purpose of many articles was to expose
injustices, provoke discussions, argue for equal treatment, and open
a forum for ideas.
Within months of launching, ONE Magazine was on the radar
of government officials.169 In August 1953, Los Angeles postmaster
Otto Olesen sent agents to the downtown offices of One, Inc.170 The
agents confiscated that month’s issue of ONE Magazine, which
carried a cover story with the headline, “Homosexual Marriage?”171
In response to the seizure of the August 1953 issue, the editors
sought the counsel of a 29-year-old heterosexual civil rights lawyer
two years out of Loyola Law School.172 Eric Julber, who attended
undergraduate school at UCLA and worked on the student newspa-
per, the Daily Bruin, thought the case had the potential to be prece-
dent setting and agreed to represent the magazine pro bono, even
though he had little experience with homosexuals.173 “I told them,
‘I never had anything to do with gay people, know nothing about
that way of life. . . . But I do know about one thing—civil liberties
and the right to be free from censorship.’”174 He said the case could
be a “landmark” case that would expand his reputation as a civil
165. LOFTIN, MASKED VOICES, supra note 141, at 37.
166. Id. at 34.
167. Id. at 31, 34–38.
168. Id.
169. FADERMAN &TIMMONS, supra note 141, at 117–18.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 118.
173. Id.
174. Id.
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rights attorney.175 After reviewing the decision to confiscate the mag-
azine, the Post Office’s solicitor determined the issue as not obscene,
and the Post Office returned the copies.176 The editors prematurely
declared victory over the Post Office under a bold heading, “ONE is
NOT GRATEFUL,” in the October 1953 edition.177 Despite their
victory, the editors were more careful about what they published.178
Julber continued to consult with the editors about their legal vul-
nerabilities despite criticism from his fellow lawyers that “[p]eople
are going to think you’re one of them.”179
The impetus for the Post Office’s next actions was likely a letter
from Senator Alexander Wiley.180 While the junior senator from
Wisconsin, Joe McCarthy, was busy connecting homosexuality and
communism as major threats to the stability of the United States,
the senior senator from the state was concerned as well.181 In April
1954, Senator Wiley sent a letter to Postmaster General Arthur
Summerfield to complain that the magazine shouldn’t be allowed to
be distributed by the Post Office.182
In the October 1954 issue—with a cover headline reading, “You
Can’t Print It!”—Julber justified and explained his role as an inter-
nal censor.183 “[T]here is one extreme school of legal thought that
would say that ONE, merely by its existence, is illegal. That reason-
ing would run as follows: Homosexual acts are made crimes in every
state of the union. ONE is published specifically for homosexuals.
Therefore, ONE is a magazine for criminals.”184 Julber explained
that the magazine’s editors risked a $5,000 fine and/or five years in
prison if convicted of distributing “obscene, lewd, lascivious or filthy”
material, so it was imperative for them to avoid “stimulating ‘sexual
desires’” in the pages of their magazines.185 He laid forth some rules
and examples:
ONE cannot print the following: lonely hearts ads, cheesecake
art or photos, descriptions of sexual acts or the preliminaries
thereto. . . . Permissible: ‘John was my friend for a year.’ Not
175. FADERMAN &TIMMONS, supra note 141, at 118.
176. Id.
177. WHITE, supra note 141, at 48–49.
178. FADERMAN &TIMMONS, supra note 141, at 118.
179. Id.
180. See DOUGLAS M. CHARLES, HOOVER’S WAR ON GAYS: EXPOSING THE FBI’S “SEX
DEVIATES” PROGRAM 180, 185 (2015).
181. Id. at 180, 182, 185.
182. Id. at 180.
183. MURDOCH & PRICE, supra note 75, at 31.
184. Id. at 31–32.
185. Id.
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permissible: ‘That night we made mad love’; descriptions of ho-
mosexuality as a practice which the author encourages. . . .
Characters cannot rub knees, feel thighs, hold hands, soap backs
or undress before one another.186
Ironically, it was the same October 1954 issue that would serve
as the basis of a landmark Supreme Court decision. The government
deemed three items in the issue as obscene: a short story, a poem
and an advertisement.187
ONE sought a court judgment deeming the magazine mailable
and an injunction against similar actions by the postmaster,188 after
the Los Angeles postmaster deemed the October 1954 issue obscene
in violation of U.S. Code Section Title 18, Section 1461, which bans
“every obscene, lewd, lascivious, or filthy book, pamphlet, picture,
paper, letter, writing, print or other publication of an indecent char-
acter.”189
Eleven months after the Post Office’s seizure, on Sept. 16, 1955,
Julber filed a complaint in U.S. District Court for Southern District
of California.190 The filing delay was compounded by money woes—
while Julber was volunteering his services the editors still needed
money for court filings and copying costs—and by Julber’s search of
potential co-counsel.191 One of his calls was to the American Civil
Liberties Union (ACLU), who he thought would be interested in a
potentially precedent setting press censorship case.192 “But, believe
it or not, when I said it involved a homosexual magazine, they said
they wouldn’t get involved. I was astounded,” Julber told journalists
Joyce Murdoch and Deb Price.193 Going at the case alone, Julber’s
complaint argued that ONE was not obscene, lewd, lascivious or
filthy, but was “informative and an exercise of privileged free speech
and communication.”194
Briefs filed by ONE and the government presented contrasting
views of the content of the three items under question. Max F. Deutz
and Joseph D. Mullender, Jr., assistant U.S. attorneys based in Los
Angeles, argued that the only question for the court was whether
the materials in ONE fit the statutory definition of nonmailable
186. Id. at 32.
187. Id. at 32–33.
188. Id. at 31; see also CHARLES, supra note 180, at 185.
189. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1461 (1994); MURDOCH & PRICE, supra note 75, at 31–32.
190. MURDOCH & PRICE, supra note 75, at 31; see also CHARLES, supra note 180, at 185.
191. MURDOCH & PRICE, supra note 75.
192. See id.
193. Id. at 31.
194. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 2, One, Inc. v. Olesen, 355 U.S. 371 (1958) (No.
290).
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matter.195 The federal statute requires that “[e]very obscene, lewd,
lascivious, indecent, filthy or vile article, matter, thing, device . . . [i]s
declared to be nonmailable matter and shall not be conveyed in the
mails or delivered from any Post Office or by any letter carrier.”196
The government argued that “Sappho Remembered” is “lustfully
stimulating to the average homosexual reader,” the “Lord Samuel and
Lord Mantagu” poem is obscene because of the “filthy words contained
in it,” and the advertisement for the Swiss publication is nonmailable
“because it gives information for obtaining obscene material.”197
U.S. District Court Judge Thurmond Clarke accepted the govern-
ment’s arguments in their entirety and ruled in the government’s
favor on a motion for summary judgment.198 “The suggestion ad-
vanced that homosexuals should be recognized as a segment of our
people and be accorded special privilege as a class is rejected,” the
judge wrote, denying ONE’s request for judgment and injunctions
against further censorship.199 ONE’s editors assailed the decision in
print, arguing that the judge presented no support for his claims that
the Sappho story was “obviously calculated to stimulate the lust of
the homosexual reader” and criticizing the judge for suggesting that
homosexuals were seeking “special rights” while they were merely
seeking to communicate to each other through the Post Office.200
While ONE’s editors and lawyer prepared for their appeal to the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, unbeknownst to them, the FBI was
investigating potential criminal obscenity charges against ONE.201
The extent of this investigation was only made known recently, when
the FBI released more than 900 pages of its files on Mattachine and
ONE.202 A week after the district court ruling against ONE, FBI
Director J. Edgar Hoover formally requested that the Department
of Justice prosecute ONE for obscenity, noting that ONE is a maga-
zine “of primary interest to sex deviates,” and that a federal judge
upheld the Post Office department solicitor’s determination that the
magazine violated federal mail statutes.203
195. Brief for the Defendant, One, Inc. v. Olesen, 241 F.2d 772 (S.D. Cal. 1957) (No.
18764-TC).
196. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1461.
197. Brief for the Defendant, supra note 195, at 3.
198. See CHARLES, supra note 180, at 185–86.
199. The decision was not reported but published in ONE Magazine in its March 1957
issue. See David S. Savage, Supreme Court Faced Gay Rights Decision in 1958 Over
‘Obscene’ Magazine, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 11, 2015), https://www.latimes.com/nation/la-na
-court-gay-magazine-20150111-story.html [https://perma.cc/68Q7-666K].
200. WHITE, supra note 141, at 78.
201. See CHARLES, supra note 180, at 185–89.
202. Id.
203. Id.
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In his thirty-four-page appeal brief to the Ninth Circuit Court
of Appeals, Julber argued that the postmaster’s decision to exclude
the magazine from the mail was “arbitrary, capricious and an abuse
of discretion” as well as unsupported by evidence” and the trial court’s
decision was “erroneous as a matter of law and fact.”204 His brief was
divided into six general arguments. First, the postmaster and dis-
trict court judge ignored several prior obscenity precedents which
require the government to consider the work as a whole, and the
intent and sincerity of the authors, in determining whether the
material was obscene.205 Julber’s brief then describes each item in
the October 1954 issue, including the statement of publishers’ pur-
poses on page two: to discuss “homo-sexuality from the scientific,
historical and critical point of view . . . to promote among the general
public an interest, knowledge and understanding . . . [and] to pro-
mote the integration into society.”206
Second, none of the magazine’s articles are obscene, lascivious
or filthy, Julber argued.207 More than half of the brief focused on
dissecting all possible offensive passages.208
A critical reading and annotation of the Sappho short story
spans six pages of the brief. Julber identified nine passages from the
story that might be considered provocative, provides their text, and
then an analysis and argument about each.209 The story as pub-
lished in ONE included the following:
Pavia closed the door of their suite behind them, tossed her coat
on a chair and gently drew the girl to her. ‘Forgiven?’ she asked
at last. She touched the delicate pulse beat beneath the light
golden hair on the child-like temple. ‘Will there ever be a day
when you won’t blush when I do that,’ she murmured.210
Julber provided his analysis for the Court as follows:
This is the description of one woman caressing another’s hair, in
a tender and moving fashion. There is nothing obscene in the
description of the act, and the question then arises whether such
an act itself embodied in a story is an obscene act.
204. Appellant Opening Brief at 4, One, Inc. v. Olesen, 241 F.2d 772 (9th Cir. 1957)
(No. 15139).
205. Id. at 5.
206. Id. at 6.
207. Id.
208. Id. at 6–20.
209. Id. at 7–12.
210. Appellant Opening Brief, supra note 204, at 8.
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It is respectfully submitted that such an episode is not obscene.
Countless examples may be found in literature, drama and motion
pictures where one woman lovingly caresses another. In “Psycho-
logy of Women,” Helene Duetsch, Grune and Stratton, 1944, the
classic psycho-analytical text on the subject, the author quotes
the author Collette, in “La Vagabonde”:
“Two women embracing are a melancholy and touching picture
of two weaknesses; perhaps they are taking refuge in each other’s
arms in order to sleep there, weep, flee from man who is often
wicked, and to taste what is more desired than any pleasure, the
bitter happiness of feeling similar, insignificant, forgotten.”
There is nothing obscene in such an act, if it is done or described
with delicacy.211
The brief continued in this fashion, dissecting the aspects of the
three items deemed obscene, and drawing analogies and parallels to
other writings.212 The brief also argues that the small advertisements
for other periodicals, found on pages 29–30 of the issue, are not for
materials that are obscene or that have ever been adjudicated ob-
scene.213 Additionally, the advertisements and associated materials
were reviewed by legal counsel before publications and determined
not to be obscene.214 “It is respectfully submitted that in the absence
of such a judicial determination, any charge of ‘obscenity’ is purely
opinion, and not even admissible as evidence,” Julber wrote.215
Julber’s third argument was that the magazine as a whole was
“not obscene, lewd, lascivious, or filthy.”216 Quoting from past Supreme
Court and appeals court precedents, Julber argued that the “dominant
tone of the work is the controlling factor; incidental stimulation is ir-
relevant.”217 A reader of the entire issue of ONE Magazine would
conclude that the magazine as a whole is “serious, responsible and
sincere,” Julber wrote.218 “The dominate tone of the magazine is one of
sincerity. It is an attempt to grapple with a social problem of the deep-
est order in terms comprehensible and palatable to laymen. It strives
to create understanding of an extremely knotty social problem.”219
Fourth, Julber argued that the Post Office was depriving ONE
Magazine of equal protection of the laws by strict enforcement of a
statute not enforced against other publishers, citing congressional
211. Id. at 8–9.
212. Id. at 9–20.
213. Id. at 20.
214. Id. at 20–21.
215. Id. at 21.
216. Appellant Opening Brief, supra note 204, at 24.
217. Id. at 24 (citing Walker v. Popenoe, 149 F.2d 511, 512 (D.C. Cir. 1945)).
218. Id. at 25.
219. Id. at 25–26.
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testimony in 1952 from Post Office inspectors about their efforts to
investigate advertisers of potential obscene materials but not the
publisher of the advertisements themselves.220 Fifth, Julber argued
that obscenity law requires that a work must be lewdly stimulative
to the average reader, not those of a particular class.221 And sixth,
Julber argued that a comparison of other contemporary publications
shows ONE is not obscene under prevailing literary standards.222
Julber attached to his brief a fifteen-page appendix, listing dozens
of other publications for sale at book stores, drug stores, newsstands
and at public libraries.223 These works “all deal with the same sub-
ject matter as is dealt with in the instant work, to wit, homosexuality,”
Julber argued.224
The fact that these books and magazines are offered for public
sale—and even carried in our public libraries—and some of
which have the status of minor classics, indicate that, under
current prevailing standards of public and literary morality, the
matter contained in the October, 1954, issue of ‘ONE’ is far from
being ‘obscene’, and in fact, is innocent and inoffensive.225
Julber’s brief made a strong case that ONE was well within the
mainstream of the popular press of the day and careful to avoid
sexually explicit language and material. The brief also used the legal
precedents of obscenity law to argue that the district court made
serious errors in its ruling.
However, Julber’s arguments failed to persuade the Ninth Circuit,
which on February 29, 1957, upheld the district court’s ruling.226
While attesting to the importance of freedom of the press—“[a]t the
outset it is well to dispel any thought that this court is its brothers
keeper as to the type of reading to be indulged in”227—the court none-
theless found ONE Magazine “morally depraving and debasing.”228
In their analysis, the Ninth Circuit judges acknowledged the
difficulties of policing public morals, but they had no problem in de-
termining that ONE Magazine was in violation. “[W]e are not unmind-
ful of the fact that morals are not static like the everlasting hills, but
are like the vagrant breezes to which the mariner must ever trim
220. Id. at 28.
221. Id. at 31.
222. Appellant Opening Brief, supra note 204, at 33.
223. Id. at a–o.
224. Id. at 33.
225. Id. at 33–34.
226. One, Inc. v. Olesen, 241 F.2d 772,779 (9th Cir. 1957), rev’d 355 U.S. 371 (1958).
227. Id. at 774.
228. Id. at 778.
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his sails,” the court wrote.229 The court must apply the postal laws
banning “obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy and indecent materials” by
defining such expressions “in the light of today’s moral dictionary,
even though the definition is at best a shifting one.”230 Drawing from
several judicial precedents, the court focused on the purpose of the
law: to protect sexual purity.231 Because the court believed ONE
Magazine’s material undermined this public morality by pandering
to sexual impurity, the Post Office was justified in prohibiting it
from the mail.232
The court noted the magazine’s stated “lofty ideals” of “dealing
primarily with homosexuality from the scientific, historical and criti-
cal points of view,” but concluded that it failed to live up to high
standards.233 Specifically, the court called the Sappho story “nothing
more than cheap pornography calculated to promote lesbianism,”
the English poem “dirty, vulgar and offensive to the moral senses,”
and the advertisement a way for individuals to obtain more obscen-
ity.234 Additionally, the court found other items in the magazine to
be “obscene and filthy,” including pictures, sketches, and another
short story.235 “The magazine under consideration, by reason of the
articles referred to, has a primary purpose of exciting lust, lewd and
lascivious thoughts and sensual desires in the minds of the persons
reading it,” the court concluded, denying the plaintiffs any relief and
determining no violations of First Amendment or equal protection
rights.236 “Social standards are fixed by and for the great majority
and not by or for a hardened or weakened minority.”237
Appealing the U.S. Supreme Court, One, Inc.’s attorney filed a
nine-page petition for a writ of certiorari on June 18, 1957.238 Julber’s
brief noted the novelty of the case when he wrote “[t]here are no de-
cisions of this Court, or, in fact, of any Court of Appeals, which deal
with the matter of the depiction of homosexuality in literature, and
the bounds and extent of the permissible depiction and discussion.”239
The petition framed four legal questions for the Court to consider:
1) Is the October 1954 issue of ONE lewd, lascivious, obscene or filthy
229. Id. at 775.
230. Id.
231. Id. at 775–77.
232. One, Inc., 241 F.2d at 777.
233. Id.
234. Id.
235. Id. at 777–78.
236. Id. at 778–79.
237. Id.
238. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 1–9, One, Inc. v. Olesen, 355 U.S. 371 (1958) (No.
290).
239. Id. at 6.
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and therefore “non-mailable” under Title 18, Section 1461 of the U.S.
administrative code?; 2) Did the postmaster and lower courts cor-
rectly gauge the “moral tone of the community” in determining ONE
was in violation of the law, or did they apply a stricter standard
than other publishers, thereby depriving them of equal protection
and due process of law?; 3) Does a “good faith” exception exist to
liability for advertisements where lewd material may conceivably be
obtained; and 4) Was ONE deprived of equal protection of the law
by its lack of enforcement of similar publications?240
Julber’s petition argued that the Ninth Circuit’s “grave restriction
of the right of free discussion and expression in literature,” decided
important questions of federal law which had not been settled by the
Supreme Court.241
By ruling that ONE was non-mailable because of its discussions
of homosexuality, the appellate court was treating homosexual mate-
rial by a different standard than other material freely available.242
Julber said the lower courts have assumed “that the mere depiction
of homosexuals or homosexual problems in literature is ‘lustful’ or
‘stimulating’ in such a manner as to render the literary work ‘ob-
scene.’”243 Other publications that deal with similar subject matter
even more explicitly have not faced similar sanctions, suggesting
ONE “has been singled out and discriminated against and made the
subject of a unique and strict application of the statute, thus deny-
ing to it equal protection of the laws and due process of law.”244 To
support his argument, Julber pointed to the lengthy appendix he
filed with the lower courts—of quotes from magazines and books that
should be used to assess the “moral tone of the community.”245
Julber also argued the decision established a more repressive
precedent than other circuits, citing cases involving advocacy of
polygamy and nudism.246 This disparate treatment among federal
circuits provided an important impetus for Supreme Court review.
He pointed to five appellate cases that “permit and encourage a
freer discussion of human and social problems than does the repres-
sive and restrictive view now taken by the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals.”247 Julber summarized the cases and argued that while
240. Id. at 2–3.
241. Id. at 6.
242. Id.
243. Id.
244. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 238, at 6.
245. Id. at 5.
246. Id. at 8.
247. Id. at 6–7 (citing Walker v. Popenoe, 149 F.2d 511 (D.C. Cir. 1945); Consumers
Union v. Walker, 145 F.2d 33 (D.C. Cir. 1944); Parmelee v. United States, 113 F.2d 729
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those ideas may be “distasteful and disgusting to the average reader,”
they were nonetheless not obscene under federal law.248 “Works which
attempt to elucidate, explain or grapple with thorny and fundamen-
tal human problems should be extended great latitude of expression,
since they often, in the last analysis, serve humanity’s ends,” Julber
wrote.249 The literary works of ONE:
are works dealing with and attempting to explain to the layman
problems of human life that have plagued the human race through
the centuries. Such an attempt to cope with a fundamental
human problem should be extended every legal latitude and
should be weighed with more care than that devoted by the Dis-
trict Court or the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in the
instant case.250
Finally, Julber noted that in ONE Magazine “there is nowhere . . .
any advocacy of homosexuality as a way of life, but only a discussion
of the problems, social, economic, and personal, which confront those
persons possessed of that particular neurosis, or complexion.”251
Julber knew that the Court had never taken a case involving
the rights of homosexuals, but he was hopeful, he later recalled,
that “a rational view of the matter would prevail and 20th-century
standards of free discussion of human problems would be upheld.”252
The U.S. government urged the Supreme Court to reject the
case.253 The government’s five-page opposition brief on behalf of Los
Angeles Postmaster Otto Olesen was filed on August 15, 1957 by J.
Lee Rankin, the U.S. Solicitor General, and also signed by Geo S.
Leonard, acting assistant attorney general, and two attorneys for
the Department of Justice, Samuel D. Slade and Hershel Shanks.254
The government characterized the legal question as, “[w]hether the
October 1954 issue of ‘One, The Homosexual Magazine,’ is obscene
and therefore non-mailable under 18 U.S.C. 1461.”255
The government acknowledged that the statute’s terms defining
“obscen[ity] and filthy matter have been recognized as necessarily
(D.C. Cir. 1940); United States v. One Book Called Ulysses, 72 F.2d 705 (2d Cir. 1934);
United States v. Dennett, 39 F.2d 564 (2d Cir. 1930)).
248. Id. at 8.
249. Id.
250. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 238, at 8.
251. Id. (emphasis omitted).
252. MURDOCH & PRICE, supra note 75, at 41.
253. Brief for the Respondent in Opposition at 3–5, One, Inc. v. Olesen, 355 U.S. 371
(1958) (No. 290).
254. Id. at 5.
255. Id. at 2.
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lacking precision.”256 The government noted the Roth precedent re-
quires the trier of fact to determine “whether to the average person,
applying contemporary community standards, the dominant theme
of the material taken as a whole appeals to prurient interest.”257 In
doing so, the brief said, the “inquiry to be made is not solved by the ap-
plication of a mathematical formula or by the use of a slide rule.”258
The government’s analysis of the lower courts decisions con-
sisted of two paragraphs.259 The brief said the appellate court’s
“method of decision” was consistent with the Roth standard.260 The
lower courts stated they considered “the magazine as a whole so as
to determine its basic or primary purpose,” and “examin[ed] in detail
certain stories, a poem, an advertisement, and the material thus ad-
vertised.”261 The brief then included three sentences from the appel-
late court’s decision stating the magazine’s primary purpose was
“exciting lust, lewd and lascivious thoughts and sensual desires in
the minds of the persons reading it,” included “morally depraving
and debasing” articles “sufficient to label the magazine as a whole,
obscene and filthy.”262 The brief concluded that “[t]here is no need
for this Court to review these findings.”263
In a lone footnote, the government said that the subject matter
of homosexuality was not the sole reason for denying mail privileges
to the magazine.264 The footnote also stated the magazine failed to
meet its mission of dealing “with homosexuality from the scientific,
historical, and critical point of view.”265 “On the contrary,” the gov-
ernment said, “the material in the magazine appears primarily to
deal with sex—openly and covertly, by drawings and words—‘in a
manner appealing to [the] prurient interest’ of those the magazine
tries to reach. The emphasis is, in the main, not on the philosophi-
cal, scientific, or educational.”266
While the decision-making of Supreme Court justices is cloaked
in secrecy, some insights come from the justice’s private notes and
views of the appeal, reported by journalists Joyce Murdoch and Deb
Price in their 2001 book Courting Justice: Gay Men and Lesbians v.
256. Id. at 4.
257. Id. (quoting Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 489 (1957)).
258. Brief for the Respondent in Opposition, supra note 253, at 4.
259. Id. at 4–5.
260. Id. at 4.
261. Id.
262. Id. at 4–5.
263. Id. at 5.
264. Brief for the Respondent in Opposition, supra note 253, at 5 n.1.
265. Id. (quoting One, Inc. v. Olesen , 241 F.2d 772, 777 (9th Cir. 1957)).
266. Id. at 5 n.1 (alteration in original) (quoting Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476,
487 (1957)).
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the Supreme Court.267 According to the docket sheets of several
justices, the justices discussed the case at its Friday conference on
October 9, 1957.268 Only one justice, Tom C. Clark, was outright op-
posed to taking the case, according to the docket sheets of Justice
Brennan.269 Several justices noted the ONE case would be held while
they considered a case raising similar questions, Sunshine Book Co.
v. Summerfield.270
After also accepting Sunshine, several law clerks argued to
their justices that ONE Magazine was being held to a different legal
standard simply because it was about homosexuality.271 One clerk
wrote to Chief Justice Warren, “were the contributions dealing with
heterosexual matters, it is doubtful the community would find them
prurient.”272 Chief Justice Warren’s clerk recommended granting
certiorari.273 In the cert memo, the clerk wrote that One, Inc. “is a
corporation engaged in the printing and distributing of the maga-
zine ‘One,’ whose purpose is to provide a means of expression for
homosexuals.”274 After summarizing the lower court decisions, the
clerk said the appropriate legal standard governing the case was set
forth in the Roth decision, and the clerk wrote that it “is difficult to
conclude the [Ninth Circuit] applied this standard.”275
Warren’s clerk focused on two deficiencies in legal analysis.
First, the clerk critiqued the lower court’s application of the “aver-
age person” test in Roth, saying they instead adopted a different
standard that assessed “the effect of the material on the potential
reader, or other specific group, rather than the ‘average person.’”276
The clerk cited as evidence the lower court’s remark “that certain
advertisements in the magazine are obscene, not because the com-
munity standard is injured, but because the purpose of the adver-
tisements is to reach homosexuals.”277 Second, the clerk emphasized
that the lower courts analyzed three allegedly obscene items in the
magazine in isolation rather than considering the work as a whole,
as Roth requires.278 “While the magazine may not have the high
267. MURDOCH & PRICE, supra note 75, at 45.
268. Id.
269. Id.
270. Id. at 45–46.
271. Id. at 42.
272. Cert Memorandum from the United States Supreme Court Justice Earl Warren’s
law clerk to Justice Earl Warren, One, Inc. v. Olesen, 355 U.S. 371 (1958) (on file with
the Library of Congress) [hereinafter Warren Cert Memorandum].
273. Id. at 4.
274. Id. at 1.
275. Id. at 2.
276. Id.
277. Id. at 3.
278. Warren Cert Memorandum, supra note 272, at 3.
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educational and scientific flavor [petitioner] would give it, it is highly
questionable whether these three pieces so mar the whole publication.
It is even questionable whether the pieces taken individually could
be classified as obscene and not just bad taste,” the clerk wrote.279
Warren’s clerk concluded that the real offense is the topic of ho-
mosexuality. “Though the [lower courts’] opinion denies this, it is
really the subject matter in general which appears troublesome below.
Were the contributions dealing with heterosexual matters, it is
doubtful the community would find them prurient,” the clerk wrote.280
Possibly because the topic is homosexuality, where the commu-
nity has expressed an aversion, a stricter standard is available
even under Roth in determining ‘obscenity’ under the community
standard, e.g., that which is homosexual and non-educational has
a greater tendency, by its very nature, to be prurient. But the (ap-
pellate court) does not even apply this test. I would suggest that
since Roth was unavailable to the court below, that this case be
reversed and remanded for reconsideration in light of Roth. In
other respects, the issues involved are worthy of argument here.281
Justice Harold H. Burton’s personal papers contain a four-page
cert memo he received from his law clerks, recommending that the
Court take the case and remand it back to the Ninth Circuit in light
of the recent Roth decision.
I read the issue of One with some mild interest. I must say that
I found it relatively inoffensive, far less offensive than the aver-
age “men’s” magazine. I think the decision below is an example
of tyranny of the majority. . . . The court seems to feel that homo-
sexuality is disgusting and therefore allusions to homosexual
practices are disgusting and obscene. . . . I think ONE is no more
descriptive of sexual practices than dozens of magazines. The
fact that the practices differ from those of the “normal” person
should not make the magazine obscene. If the story in ONE is
“calculated to promote lesbianism” certain stories in Woman’s
Home Journal are probably calculated to promote adultery.282
Meanwhile, Justice Douglas—long hailed as one of the few First
Amendment absolutists to serve on the court—was given a different
view by his law clerk.
279. Id.
280. Id. at 4.
281. Id.
282. Cert Memorandum from the United States Supreme Court Justice Harold H.
Burton clerk to Justice Harold H. Burton, One, Inc. v. Olesen, 355 U.S. 371 (1958) (on file
with the Library of Congress).
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The fact that any incitement to do a physical act in this mag-
azine is inciting the commission of a crime in every state while
the same cannot be said of girly magazines is difficult to ignore
in arguing the standard should be the same. . . . I am torn between
the desire to cut down on this sort of administrative censorship
and the revulsion the magazine gives me. I suppose in the long
run it is better to let the American people make the choice than
a postmaster.283
The internal debate and voting on ONE is known only because
of the tally sheet found in Justice Douglas’s papers, made public after
his death in 1980.284 Five justices voted to take the case—one more
than is required by the court’s “rule of four.”285 On January 3, 1958,
the justices voted on the cert. petition, with five justices voting to
take case: Felix Frankfurter, William Douglas, Hugo Black, Charles
Whittaker, and John Marshall Harlan.286 Four of those, excluding
Black, wanted to reverse the Ninth Circuit and rule in favor of ONE,
according to Justice’s Douglas’s tally sheet.287 On Justice Black’s
conference notes, he wrote “Deny?” next to One, Inc. v. Olesen.288
Rather than request briefs and hold oral arguments, as is usually
the case, a week later the court held votes on the substance of One,
Inc. v. Olesen and two other cases involving nudist magazines.289
Frankfurter, Douglas, Clark, Harlan, and Whittaker favored ONE,
while Warren, Black, Brennan and Burton would have upheld the
Ninth Circuit’s decision.290
Three days later, the Court issued a one-sentence ruling. “The
petition for writ of certiorari is granted and the judgment of the
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit is reversed.
Roth v. United States.”291
B. Sunshine Book Co. v. Summerfield
The Supreme Court’s landmark decision in One, Inc. v. Olesen
may not have happened if the Court hadn’t held the case to be de-
cided alongside Sunshine Book Co. v. Summerfield. Two magazines
283. Cert Memorandum from the United States Supreme Court Justice William O.
Douglas clerk to Justice William O. Douglas, One, Inc. v. Olesen, 355 U.S. 371 (1958) (on
file with the Library of Congress).
284. MURDOCH & PRICE, supra note 75, at 46–47.
285. Id.
286. Id. at 45.
287. Administrative Docket Book O.T. 1957 #200-399, One, Inc. v. Olesen, 355 U.S.
371 (1958) (on file with the Library of Congress).
288. MURDOCH & PRICE, supra note 75, at 45.
289. Id. at 46.
290. Id.
291. One, Inc. v. Olesen, 355 U.S. 371 (1958).
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advocating the lifestyle of nudism had also become targets of the
Post Office in the early 1950s, ultimately prompting the Court’s de-
cision upholding their First Amendment rights to publish in tandem
with ONE Magazine’s right to publish.
The two nudist magazines, Sunshine & Health and Sun Maga-
zine, were published in New Jersey and edited by Dr. Ilsley Boone, a
Baptist minister who was described as the “dean of American nud-
ists,” and his adult daughter, Margaret A.B. Pulis.292 Sunshine &
Health had published for more than twenty-five years and Sun
Magazine for six years.293 Sunshine & Health focused on nudists in
the United States and Canada, while Sun Magazine was more in-
ternational in scope.294 At the time of his appeal to the Supreme Court,
Boone was seventy-eight years old. His family, including his chil-
dren, grandchildren, and great grandchildren, were all nudists.295
Dr. Boone had traveled to visit nudist camps around the world, and
he advocated that nudist lifestyles were healthy and did not lead to
sexual delinquency or lasciviousness.296 “Dr. Boone believes that hu-
man beings will be healthier physically and mentally if they practice
nudism; that the practice of nudism will satisfy the healthy curiosity
of children and eliminate the unhealthy curiosity of adults about the
human body,” his lawyer, O. John Rogge, wrote.297
The magazine periodically ran into legal trouble in its distribu-
tion. In New York City in 1951, the police arrested several newsstand
clerks for selling Sunshine & Health and Sun Magazine, charging
them with violating section 1141 of the Penal Law prohibiting the sale
or distribution of “any obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, indecent or
disgusting book, magazine, pamphlet, newspaper [or] photograph.”298
The city’s Department of Licenses also threatened newsstand opera-
tors with license revocations for future violations, sending them a
letter stating that the selling of the magazines would result in
suspension or revocation of their licenses.299
New York State Supreme Court Judge Thomas L.J. Corcoran
rejected Sunshine Book Company’s attempt at an injunction against
292. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 4, Sunshine Book Co. v. Summerfield, 355 U.S.
372 (D.C. Cir. 1958) (No. 587). For a history of the American nudist movement, including
background on Boone and the two magazines, see BRIAN HOFFMAN, NAKED: A CULTURAL
HISTORY OF AMERICAN NUDISM 64–82 (2015) and Brian Hoffman, ‘A Certain Amount of
Prudishness’: Nudist Magazines and the Liberalisation of American Obscenity Law,
1947–58, 22 GENDER & HISTORY 708, 710–18 (2010).
293. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 292, at 4.
294. Id. at 4.
295. Id. at 5.
296. Id.
297. Id.
298. Sunshine Book Co. v. McCaffrey, 112 N.Y.S.2d 476, 478 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1952).
299. Id. at 478–79.
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New York City’s actions.300 While the text in the magazines contain
“nothing obscene in the literary content,” noting that stories focused
on reports of “meeting and conventions, reports of officers, the ‘Olym-
pic Games’ of the movement, public relations theories for the expan-
sion of nudism, reports of regional associations and local clubs,
conflicts between nudism and the law, expositions of nudism for the
advancement of physical and mental health, religious justifications
of nudism, etc.,” it is the photographs that make the magazines vul-
nerable.301 While “[s]ome of them are action pictures showing nudists
in their camp activities, rowing, hitting volley balls, building fires,
etc.,” others “show shapely and attractive young women in alluring
poses in the nude” and “are front views . . . cleverly colored to picture
clearly the female breasts and pubic hair.”302 Judge Corcoran had no
difficulty in dismissing Sunshine Book Company’s arguments, saying
that nudism was a practice associated with the “lowest grades of sav-
ages” and the pictures in the magazines clearly met the standards
of obscenity.303
Where the dominant purpose of nudity is to promote lust, it is ob-
scene and indecent. The distribution and sale of the magazines
in this case is a most objectionable example. The dominant purpose
of the photographs in these magazines is to attract the attention
of the public by an appeal to their sexual impulses. The sale of
these magazines is not limited to any mailing list of members or
subscribers. They are sold and distributed indiscriminately to all
who wish to purchase the same. Men, women, youths of both
sexes, and even children, can purchase these magazines. They
will have a libidinous effect upon most ordinary, normal, healthy
individuals. Their effect upon the abnormal individual may be
more disastrous. Their sale and distribution is bound to add to
the already burdensome problem of juvenile delinquency and sex
crimes, and the commissioner of police properly arrested those
who participated in this violation of our Penal Law.304
Judge Corcoran said New York City’s ban on subsequent news-
stand sales of Sunshine & Health was not an unconstitutional prior
restraint, citing Near v. Minnesota’s exceptions to the prior restraint
doctrine, including that “the primary requirements of decency may
be enforced against obscene publications.”305 Judge Corcoran’s
300. Id. at 485–86.
301. Id. at 480.
302. Id.
303. Id. at 483.
304. Sunshine Book, 112 N.Y.S.2d at 483.
305. Id. at 485.
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decision was an overwhelming loss for the magazine’s fight for
newsstand sales.
The New York City newsstand cases went to trial on the question
of whether the magazines were obscene, resulting in a jury finding
that the magazines were obscene.306 However, six years later, a New
York appeals court later decided that the city’s letter threatening
newsstands with license suspension or revocation for selling the
magazines was in fact a prior restraint that violated the First Amend-
ment.307 The appeals court wrote that there were no statutory provi-
sions allowing a city official to determine whether publications are
obscene, and “certainly, any censorship in advance of publication con-
stitutes an unconstitutional and illegal prior restraint.”308 The city’s
letter to newsstands “was to compel obedience by the newsdealers;
and to some extent must have been effective in curtailing, and pre-
venting the sale of future copies of plaintiffs’ magazines,” the court
wrote.309 The court required the city to notify newstands that the
1951 letter was to be disregarded because it violated the magazine
publisher’s First Amendment rights.310
In addition the legal threats to newsstand sales, the magazine’s
subscription base was also under scrutiny by the government. The
Post Office branch in May’s Landing, New Jersey began flagging
particular issues of Sunshine & Health and Sun Magazine, en-
snarling the magazine in administrative reviews that spanned years
over particular issues.311 The first instance involved the mailability
of five monthly issues of Sunshine & Health in 1948, cases that
were ultimately dismissed by the Post Office Department in 1951.312
Even though the publication won in the end, the actual seizures of
issues and delivery ban caused financial burdens for the magazine,
because the magazine depended on prompt delivery of its issues for
its business survival.
In this country today periodical publications depend for their
existence upon their prompt circulation by means of the United
States mails. This is so for two reasons: in the first place, any
delay in the distribution of a dated periodical means the death of
that issue; in the second place, periodicals depend for their con-
tinued existence on dissemination through the mails because
306. Sunshine Book Co. v. McCaffrey, 168 N.Y.S.2d 268, 271–72 (N.Y. App. Div. 1957).
307. Id.
308. Id. at 273.
309. Id.
310. Id. at 274.
311. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 292, at 9–16.
312. Id. at 6.
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they receive a larger percentage of return on copies so distrib-
uted to subscribers than on copies disseminated by other means.313
According to the magazine’s lawyers, three separate investiga-
tions between 1948 and 1956 into particular issues each took about
three years for final resolution through the Post Office Department’s
administrative procedures.314 Interventions by the Post Office to re-
fuse delivery of particular issues while a hearing by a postal examiner
was scheduled effectively ruined that issue’s economic value. “The
questions involved in such proceedings are never resolved expedi-
tiously and any monthly periodicals which are involved in them will
become obsolete long before those proceedings are at an end,” the
magazine’s lawyers wrote in their brief arguing the Supreme Court
to take their case.315
Before the case that was granted for review by the Supreme
Court, the Post Office had lost a similar case in the federal courts
over seizures of the magazine.316 In the fall of 1952, the Post Office
sought to stop all incoming and outgoing mail for the magazine’s
addresses on the grounds that it published an obscene magazine.317
After a hearing examiner ruled in favor of the mail ban in March
1953 and the Postmaster General upheld the ruling in June 1953,
the magazine filed suit in federal court, seeking declaratory and
injunctive relief.318 A district court judge found the magazines not
to be obscene,319 and the Court of Appeals for the District of Colum-
bia upheld the lower court.320 The Supreme Court denied certiorari.321
But the magazine’s victory was short lived. In the fall of 1954,
the postmaster in May’s Landing, New Jersey, reported that 400
issues of the February 1955 issue of Sunshine & Health and the
January–February 1955 issue of Sun Magazine were being withheld
from the mails at the direction of the Postmaster General.322 An ad-
ministrative hearing was scheduled before a hearing examiner of the
Post Office Department.323 The examiner determined the magazines
to be “obscene, lewd, lascivious and indecent.”324 The examiner wrote:
313. Id. at 26.
314. Id. at 27.
315. Id. at 27.
316. Summerfield v. Sunshine Book Co., 221 F.2d 42, 43–44, 48 (D.C. Cir. 1954).
317. Id. at 43–44.
318. Id.
319. Id. at 44.
320. Id. at 48.
321. 349 U.S. 921 (1955).
322. Brief for Respondent in Opposition at 4, Sunshine Book Co. v. Summerfield, 355
U.S. 372 (1958).
323. Id. at 6–7.
324. Id. at 10.
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The right to practice nudism and to advocate its practices by any
lawful means is not in issue here. But in the course of such ad-
vocacy the display of unadorned nakedness to the public gener-
ally is surely offensive to presently prevailing American standards
of decency and modesty. The fact that the photographs in these
magazines may illustrate nudist life and activities and are ac-
companied by relevant textual matter upon the subject does not
in any way tend to lessen the erotic impact of the photographs
themselves upon the mind of the ordinary person.325
The Post Office’s Solicitor General affirmed the examiner’s decision.326
Simultaneous with the Post Office’s hearing and solicitor general
review, in January 1955, Sunshine Book Company filed a complaint
in U.S. district court, seeking injunctive relief to stop the Post Office
from impounding the issues and declaratory relief for a judgment
that the magazines were not obscene.327 The magazine was repre-
sented by O. John Rogge and Josiah Lyman.328
In a lengthy and remarkable decision that explicated the maga-
zine’s photographs in great critical detail, Judge James Kirkland of
the District of Columbia District Court ruled in favor of the Post
Office.329
First, Judge Kirkland began his decision by examining the defi-
nition of obscenity and the legal justifications for its status as un-
protected expression.330 Obscenity “must be calculated to lower that
standard which we regard as essential to civilization or calculated
with the ordinary person to deprave his morals or lead to impure
purposes.”331 The federal obscenity statute, 18 U.S. Code Section 1461,
uses additional adjectives to elucidate the word obscene, including
“lewd,” “lascivious,” “filthy,” and “indecent,” and Judge Kirkland cited
thirteen cases in which the courts provided definitions of obscenity
to frame his definitional analysis.332 The judge also discussed vari-
ous definitions of the reasonable person standard before turning to
the specifics of the magazine.333 The judge determined that the
“American people are a clothed race” and that “nudism in its present
stage is a cult or a society or a group that represents a very small
minority of the American people.”334
325. Id.
326. Id. at 11.
327. Sunshine Book Co. v. Summerfield, 128 F. Supp. 564, 565 (D.C. Dist. Ct. 1955).
328. Id.
329. Id. at 573.
330. Id. at 567–68.
331. Id. at 567.
332. Id.
333. Sunshine, 128 F. Supp. at 568.
334. Id. at 569–70.
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Next, over thirty-three paragraphs going almost page by page
of the magazines, the judge explained why in his determination some
aspects of the magazine were not obscene but others were.335 The
judge paid particular attention to the focus and clarity of visual de-
pictions of pubic area and genitalia.336 For example, he determined
that “broad pen sketches” of the female form “because of their in-
definiteness, of failure to emphasize any particular part of the male
or female genital area, are not obscene as a matter of fact.”337 Other
depictions that are not obscene include “posterior views of nudes, be
they male or female, young or old, whether photographed or sketched
at short or long distances”338 as well as “[p]ictures taken at sufficient
distance” even if “being a front view.”339 The judge said it “depends
upon the distance of the camera’s focus or the projection of the artist
or the one who is sketching the scene—the distance as projected
from the viewer’s eye.”340
When it comes to the female breast, the judge wrote, “there is
always the problem of the acceptance of its exposure by the majority
of the American people.”341 While the “organ, of course, is one of nu-
trition for young, expanding during periods of pregnancy and re-
ducing in size when the state of non-pregnancy and the nurture of
the young child has no longer required its function,” other cases in
which “its accentuation, its distortion, or its grossness could, under
the broad definition, depending on the situation, make it filthy or
might make it indecent.”342
But, the judge said, “[w]here photographs are taken of the pubic
area at very close range they are as a matter of fact obscene, and it
will follow, as a consequence, as a matter of law, obscene.”343 For
example, a picture on page thirteen of the February 1955 issue of
Sunshine & Health shows a man standing with a side view in which
his penis is visible.344 The judge explained why he found this objec-
tionable:
By artful use of shadow his face is completely obliterated, his en-
tire public area is obliterated by the shadow, but prominently
shown in front of the public area and against this dark background
335. Id. at 570–73.
336. Id. at 570.
337. Id. at 569.
338. Id. at 570.





344. Id. at 571.
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is his male organ; the corona of the penis is clearly discernible;
in fact, even a casual observation of it indicates that the man is
circumcised. This obviously has no place even in illustrating the
principles of nudism. It is filthy, it is foul, it is obscene, and the
Court will hold such as a matter of fact.345
A “grotesque, vile” depiction of a nude woman with varicose veins
was also found to be obscene in the judge’s view:
On page 15 there are four middle-aged women with their backs
to a very large oak tree, appearing to be some 12 feet in diame-
ter. They are holding hands and facing the camera. Only two of
the women are revealed to the viewer. The woman to the left is
a woman of middle age. She has very large thighs. The pubic
hair is clearly shown. Her right thigh is particularly noticeable
because, though there are trees nearby, the formation which
appears on the thigh is not that of shadow, it appears to be
matted varicose veins that cause her to be grotesque, vile, hold
her up as an object of scorn, and the Court will hold under the
statute that that is filthy, and that it is indecent.346
After describing other objections in similar terms and detail,
the judge addressed the administrative procedures only briefly. He
concluded that the Postmaster was “right” to exclude the magazines
from the U.S. mail because in his determination five photographs
contained within them made the magazine’s dominant theme one
that was obscene. He dismissed the case.347
Sunshine Book Company appealed the decision to the District
of Columbia Court of Appeals.348 On May 31, 1956, a divided three-
judge panel overturned the district court’s decision, issuing an in-
junction permanently restraining the Department from enforcing it.349
The panel, on a 2–1 vote, said the Post Office examiner, solicitor
and district judge showed “no effort to weigh the material consid-
ered objectionable against the rest of the contents,” contrary to court
precedents requiring questionable materials to be considered as a
whole.350 “The standard must be the likelihood that the work will so
much arouse the salacity of the reader to whom it is sent as to out-
weigh any literary, scientific or other merits it may have in that
345. Sunshine, 128 F. Supp. at 571.
346. Id.
347. Id. at 573.
348. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 292, at 62.
349. Id. at 68.
350. Id. at 65.
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reader’s hands,” the court wrote, citing its 1945 decision in Walker v.
Popenoe.351 The appeals panel said there was no evidence the inves-
tigators considered the intent of the publisher, despite “uncontro-
verted affidavits” of a Baptist minister providing substantial evidence
of sincerity of motive an the lack of “[profitable] pandering.”352
The panel also strongly objected to the procedures in place at
the Post Office preventing the distribution of materials prior to a
final adjudication that the materials are obscene.353 The criminal
statute giving the Post Office authority “contains no language which
can be construed to permit the Department to refuse to transport and
deliver newspaper and magazines pending final decision on its part
as to whether their content is acceptable to it.”354 In dissent, Judge
Danaher said the magazines “were obscene by any standard.”355
The government petitioned for an en banc review before the full
District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals.356 The court held ar-
guments on September 25, 1956 but postponed its decision pending
the outcome of several obscenity decisions in the Supreme Court.357
On October 3, 1957, a divided 5–3 court reversed the panel ruling, this
time, with Judge Danaher writing for the majority.358 His decision
emphasized the magazines’ “continuous pattern of dissemination of
nude photographs” that courts have said will “have a libidinous ef-
fect upon most ordinary, normal, healthy individuals. Their effect
upon the abnormal individual may be more disastrous.”359 Judge
Danaher also dismissed due process arguments, finding that the
Post Office Department’s procedures were sufficient and did not con-
stitute a prior restraint.360
The judges in dissent emphasized the lack of safeguards in the
administrative procedures: “Has the publication been found ‘obscene’
by a proper tribunal, applying proper standards? Has the punish-
ment or remedy been authorized by proper legislation?” the judges
wrote. “In the instant case, these questions have not yet been ade-
quately answered.”361 The judges noted that “an administrative prior
351. Id. at 64 (internal quotation marks omitted).
352. Id. at 65.
353. Id. at 65–66.
354. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 292, at 73.
355. Id. at 69.
356. Id. at 44.
357. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 292, at app. I at 44 (citing Roth v.
United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957); Alberts v. California, 354 U.S. 476 (1957); Kingsley
Books, Inc. v. Brown, 354 U.S. 436 (1957)).
358. Sunshine Book Co. v. Summerfield, 249 F.2d 114, 115, 119 (D.C. Cir. 1957).
359. Id. at 119.
360. Id.
361. Id. at 120.
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restraint, not plainly authorized by statute and not subject to spe-
cific standards and safeguards, is of highly doubtful validity, to say
the least.”362
Sunshine Book Co.’s last chance was an appeal to the U.S. Su-
preme Court. Attorney Rogge prepared a forty-page petition for writ
of certiorari, filed within a month of the District of Columbia Circuit
Court of Appeals decision, on October 30, 1957.363 Rogge argued that
the case presented an important, unresolved question: does the federal
obscenity statute give the Post Office authority to make ad hoc de-
terminations about whether materials are obscene, and therefore
unmailable?364 Allowing the Post Office to make decisions on whether
materials are obscene would undermine the due process protections
afforded in criminal proceedings, including the right to a jury trial,
he argued.365 In fact, Rogge noted, a specific provision giving the Post
Office more direct authority in deciding the whether publications
were obscene was stricken by Senators in legislative drafting of the
first obscenity statute.366 An attempt in 1915 to give the postmaster
general greater powers also failed, on grounds that it invested too
much censorial power.367 In rejecting the proposal, one senator said
the “bill would invest one man . . . with the power to destroy the
business of a publisher without affording any opportunity for trial
by jury, according to regular Court practice. . . . Trial by jury and a
penalty inflicted for each specified act is the only safeguard against
an arbitrary and tyrannical power.”368 In the present case, Rogge
argued that the Post Office was acting as police, prosecutor, judge
and jury. And because periodicals relied on the mail for subscrip-
tions, the postmaster general’s ability to withhold publications at
will granted him “the power of life and death over periodical publica-
tions” by sweeping powers of prior restraint.369
Rogge argued that the decisions by postmaster general and the
district and appellate courts were inconsistent with the Supreme
Court’s ruling in Roth v. United States, issued just months earlier.370
Rogge focused on three aspects of the decisions as being inconsistent
with Roth: using isolated photographs without considering the
publication as a whole; applying inappropriate standards such as
362. Id. at 121.
363. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 292.
364. Id. at 2.
365. Id. at 20.
366. Id. at 21–22.
367. Id. at 22.
368. Id. at 22 (internal quotation marks omitted).
369. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 292, at 26.
370. Id. at 29.
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“grotesque” and “vile”; and failing to consider the conduct and intent
of the publisher.371 The postmaster and lower courts singled out five
photographs to determine the entire issues of the magazine were ob-
scene, Rogge argued, violating Roth’s test that requires “the domi-
nant theme of the material taken as a whole appeals to prurient
interest.”372 The “proscribed photographs occupied but 3% of the space
in the questioned issue of Sunshine & Health and but 2% of the space
in the questioned issue of Sun Magazine,” Rogge wrote.373 Also, Rogge
argued that the district judge did not apply appropriate standards
in his evaluation of the photographs.374 Rogge argued the judge erred
by deciding that “grotesque,” “vile” and “filthy” photographs were
the same as obscenity.375 Roth requires that obscenity “deals with
sex in a manner appealing to prurient interest”376 and which has “a
tendency to excite lustful thoughts.”377 Finally, by failing to consider
the conduct and intent of the publisher, the Post Office and courts
did not attempt distinguish “honest, sincere” works from those who
are “profitably pandering to the lewd and lascivious,” Rogge wrote.378
The conduct and intent of the publisher, in advocating nudism as a
healthy way of life, requires “pictures to illustrate the text and show
the healthy enjoyment that people derive from being out of doors in
the nude,” Rogge wrote.379
Had the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
taken into account the conduct and intent of Dr. Boone and his
associates, their belief in nudism and their desire to advance it,
their distribution of the publications in question in order to gain
new converts to nudism, the absence of a dominant profit motive
and the use [of] the pictures in these publications to make more
effective the presentation of the ideas of nudism, the scales should
have been tipped in favor of the legality of these publications.380
Rogge cited Warren’s concurrence in Roth and his dissent in
Kinsley Books as evidence of the requirement that the conduct and
intent of the publisher is a critical part of the legal analysis.381 “The
371. Id. at 29–31.
372. Id. at 29–30 (internal quotation marks omitted).
373. Id. at 30–31.
374. Id.
375. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 292, at 30.
376. Id. at 30–31.
377. Id. at 31.
378. See id. at 31–32 (internal quotation marks omitted).
379. See id. at 32.
380. Id. at 33.
381. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 292, at 33–34.
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advocacy of nudism is as old as Plato, with modern adherents
throughout the world,” Rogge wrote.382 “Surely the First Amendment
protects such advocacy, as well as any means which are reasonably
and fairly relevant to it. This includes pictures.”383
Rogge argued that the Post Office violated due process in its
administrative procedures by failing to provide adequate hearings
and allow expert testimony. “All the Post Office Department wants
is to have some officials in Washington look at the questioned publi-
cations and decide for the whole country whether they are safe for
the people to read or see,” Rogge wrote.384
In its opposition brief, the government urged the Supreme Court
to decline to review the case.385 In a brief filed by Solicitor General
J. Lee Rankin, the government provided a detailed accounting of the
Post Office Department’s procedures in the case, arguing they did
not violate due process.386 The government also argued the obscenity
determination did not contradict the Supreme Court’s recent ruling
in Roth.387
In the personal papers of three Supreme Court justices appear
memos from clerks recommending granting Sunshine Books’ peti-
tion for certiorari. Clerks to Justices Douglas and Burton strongly
recommended taking the case and criticized the government’s likely
overreach.388 A clerk for Justice Warren was more circumspect, say-
ing the case may not be “certworthy” on its own but would be if the
Court decided to grant cert in the ONE case.389 Justice Warren’s
clerk expressed skepticism of Sunshine Books’ argument that the
Post Office procedures amount to an improper prior restraint as an
implied power not found explicitly in the statute.390 Warren’s clerk
noted that the government “points to 80 years of well defined ad-
ministrative practice and construction of the foregoing statute as
382. Id. at 34.
383. Id.
384. Id. at 35–36.
385. Brief for Respondent in Opposition, supra note 322, at 14, 31.
386. Id. at 6–11.
387. Id. at 27–31.
388. Cert Memorandum from the United States Supreme Court Justice William O.
Douglas clerk to Justice William O. Douglas, Sunshine Book Co. v. Summerfield, 355 US
372 (Aug. 26, 1957) (on file with the Library of Congress) [hereinafter Douglas Cert
Memorandum]; Cert Memorandum from the United States Supreme Court Justice
Harold H. Burton clerk to Harold H. Burton, Sunshine Book Co. v. Summerfield, 355 US
372 (Dec. 31, 1957) (on file with the Library of Congress) [hereinafter Burton Cert
Memorandum].
389. Cert Memorandum from the United States Supreme Court Justice Earl Warren
clerk to Justice Earl Warren, Sunshine Book Co. v. Summerfield, 355 US 372 (Aug. 26,
1957) (on file with the Library of Congress) [hereinafter Cert Memorandum].
390. Id. at 3–4.
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conferring the power which it purports to exercise here.”391 The clerk
said it was “absurd” to say the Post Office couldn’t withhold from the
mails material that it was quickly submitting for review for sus-
pected obscenity.392 “The barn could never be locked until after the
horses were gone,” the clerk wrote.393 “In my judgment this issue is
not independently certworthy absent the unlikely circumstance that
another circuit will create a conflict by adopting the dissenters’
position.”394 Nor did the clerk think the administrative procedures
amounted to a violation of due process.395 The case was potentially
unique to justify review under the new Roth standard only if the
Court were to also take the ONE Magazine case, Justice Warren’s
clerk wrote.396 “The cases are strikingly similar in that both deal
with patterns of conduct deemed innocent by rather large minority
groups, but so repulsive to the overwhelming majority that they give
rise to criminal liability,” the clerk wrote.397 “Whether the mails can
be used to disseminate written information and advocacy by such
groups is the common issue.”398 He recommended taking the case
only if the ONE case was also accepted for review.399 Justice Douglas’s
clerk was more direct in recommending granting the writ of certio-
rari.400 The case “presents an opportunity to limit the post master’s
powers and should be taken for that reason,” Justice Douglas’s clerk
wrote in a one-page memo.401
The seven-page cert memo to Justice Burton encourages him to
take the case “to mark the limits of the power of the Post Office to
bar obscene material.”402 The case presented important questions of
both statutory interpretation and constitutional law, Justice Burton’s
clerk wrote.403 First, it was unclear whether 18 U.S.C. § 1461 allows
the Post Office to ban materials not yet deemed obscene.404 While it
“seems fair to conclude that a gloss could reasonably be read into
the statute to imply the power claimed in light of the administrative
practice,” the clerk criticized the District of Columbia Court of
391. Id. at 2.
392. Id. at 3–4.
393. Id. at 4.
394. Id.
395. Cert Memorandum, supra note 389, at 6–7.
396. Id. at 7.
397. Id. at 6.
398. Id. at 6.
399. Id.
400. Douglas Cert Memorandum, supra note 388, at 1.
401. Id.
402. Burton Cert Memorandum, supra note 388, at 7.
403. Id. at 5.
404. Id. at 3.
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Appeals for ignoring its own precedent in Walker v. Pepenoe, in which
the Court ruled material could not be barred from the mail until
materials were deemed obscene in administrative hearing.405 Sec-
ond, the case raised important questions about the definition of ob-
scenity as applied to the magazines.406 By focusing on a handful of
pictures depicting adult genitals or the pubic area to determine the
magazines obscene, “[t]he court could have found a medical text
obscene on the same theory.”407 The clerk was sympathetic to the pe-
titioner’s arguments about not examining the “dominant effect” of the
magazines “as a whole,” refusing to allow expert witness testimony,
and not accounting for the “motive and purpose” of the sender.408
On January 13, 1958, the Supreme Court issued its one sen-
tence per curiam order: “The petition for writ of certiorari is granted
and the judgement of the United States Court of Appeals for the
District is reversed. Roth v. United States.”409
While the decision, like One, Inc. v. Olesen, was per curiam with-
out any reporting of dissents, the docket sheet in Justice Burton’s
files indicate the case was close: Justice Whittaker, Harlan, Douglas
and Frankfurter voted for reversal, while Justices Brennan, Clark,
Burton and Warren voted no.410 On Justice Burton’s docket sheet,
Justice Black’s vote was left blank.411 Justice Douglas’s docket sheet
contains different notations, suggesting that Justices Black and
Clark supported reversal.412
C. Manual Enterprises, Inc. v. Day
Four years after the decisions in One, Inc. v. Olesen and Sunshine
Books Co. v. Summerfield, the Supreme Court heard its second case
involving the censorship of a magazine involving homosexuals. The
case, Manual Enterprises, Inc. v. Day, involved the publications of
H. Lynn Womack and his Manual Enterprises company based in
Washington, D.C.413
405. Id. at 3–4.
406. Id. at 5.
407. Id. at 6.
408. Burton Cert Memorandum, supra note 388, at 6–7.
409. Sunshine Book Co. v. Summerfield, 355 U.S. 372, 372 (1958).
410. Administrative Docket Book, Sunshine Book Co. v. Summerfield, 355 U.S. 372,
372 (1958) (on file with the Library of Congress).
411. Id.
412. Douglas Docket Sheet, Sunshine Book Co. v. Summerfield, 355 U.S. 372, 372
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644 WM. & MARY J. RACE, GENDER & SOC. JUST.              [Vol. 26:599
The tentacles of obscenity law would be a constant presence in
H. Lynn Womack’s life. As one of the first printers and mass distrib-
utors of gay erotica in the United States, Womack connected gay
men to a subculture of sexual identity and desire more than perhaps
any other publisher before.414
Born in Mississippi in 1923, Womack moved to Washington,
D.C., for college and spent much of his middle life living in or near
the nation’s capital.415 Womack struck a stark physical presence, with
albino skin, white hair and weighing nearly 300 pounds.416 He mar-
ried twice and had a daughter.417 Womack earned a Ph.D. in philoso-
phy from John Hopkins University and then taught at George
Washington University and Mary Washington College in Virginia.418
In 1960, Womack stumbled into the publishing business after falling
into money from an illegal stock scheme in which he narrowly
avoided arrest.419 A few years earlier, he left academia to start a
fraudulent government consulting business that was shut down by
the Securities and Exchange Commission but left him with a size-
able pot of money.420 An accountant friend told him publishing was
the most profitable business in Washington, so he bought two estab-
lished printing companies, one that did printing for the government
and another whose publications included a series of bodybuilding
magazines, including Grecian Guild Pictorial, popular among homo-
sexual men.421 The business proved to be a success, and by the late
1960s, Womack described himself as the fourth largest pornographer
in America.422 In addition to publishing, Womack would later go on
to open a chain of adult bookstores in and around Washington, D.C.,
creating commercial spaces for sexually themed communications.423
Early in his publishing career, Womack recognized a lucrative
market for physique magazines.424 He printed established titles and
developed new ones, under a company he named Manual Enterprises,
Rodger Streitmatter & John C. Watson, Herman Lynn Womack: Pornographer as First
Amendment Pioneer, 28 JOURNALISM HISTORY 45 (Summer 2002).
414. Supra note 292 and accompanying text.
415. Streitmatter & Watson, supra note 413, at 57.
416. Id. at 56.
417. Id.
418. Id. at 57.
419. Id.
420. Id.
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Inc.425 One of Womack’s former employees told scholars Rodger
Streitmatter and John Watson that Womack struck deals with other
distributors serving major cities on the east coast to expand news-
stand sales and in creative agreements with photographers, who
allowed Womack to publish their photographs without buying the
rights, in exchange for listing photographers’ contact information
that allowed readers to buy more explicit photographs directly from
the photographers.426
Historian David K. Johnson has shown how physique magazines
in the 1950s and 1960s blurred the lines of political and consumer
activism in the homophile era, in which the capitalistic impulses of
publishing entrepreneurs fueled the creation of gay identity, com-
munity and resistance.427 Publishers adopted early examples of
modern media segmentation strategies to find and retain gay audi-
ences, including through coveted mailing lists and delicate partner-
ships with newsstand distributors.428 Connecting gay men to a
subculture that was yet to fully blossom, scholars have argued the
magazines played a powerful role in the building of a movement.
“Although we call it the homophile movement, it could just as easily
be labeled the physique era,” Johnson argued.429
Physique magazines covertly pitched to gay male audiences
exploded in popularity in the 1950s, evolving from earlier fitness
and bodybuilding magazines which had themselves had a strong gay
following.430 The new genre of magazines for men who appreciated
the “glorification of the male body” with aesthetically pleasing
photographs of men with “natural” or “classical” builds often gazing
at one another, suggesting friendship and comradery.431 Full nudity
was off limits, but little was left to the imagination of men wearing
tight bathing suits and scant “posing straps.”432
Early entrepreneurs of physique magazines include Bob Mizer,
who turned to publishing after finding success as a physique photog-
rapher in the 1940s, taking photographs of bodybuilders at Muscle
Beach in Santa Monica and selling them through a pen-pal service
advertised in Strength & Health, a physical culture magazine of the
era.433 He launched his own magazine from Los Angeles, Physique
425. Id. at 58.
426. Id.
427. JOHNSON, supra note 413, at vii–xiv.
428. See id. at xii, 5.
429. Id. at xiv.
430. Id. at 7–8.
431. Id. at 8 (internal quotation marks omitted).
432. See id. at 9.
433. JOHNSON, supra note 413, at 26–27.
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Pictorial, in 1951, that he would publish for twenty years and that
historian Johnson describes as the “first large-circulation American
magazine targeting gay men.”434 In Virginia, Randolph Benson and
John Bullock launched Grecian Guild Pictorial in 1955.435 The
magazine drew on homosexual themes from the brotherhood of men
in ancient Greece and quickly became popular among gay men,
generating at its peak a monthly print run of 55,000 copies and
$4,000 profit.436
From their start, physique magazines sparked the scrutiny of
the government censors. Mizer’s run-ins with authorities began
during his photographer days. In 1945, postal inspectors raided his
house and confiscated “dirty pictures,” leading them to subsequently
raid the photo studio where he worked and arresting his boss.437 A
year later, he was arrested for selling photographs of nude 17-year-
old male as part of an investigation into teenage bodybuilders at
Muscle Beach that ultimately led to a police crackdown of all pho-
tographers at the beach.438 At one point, famed sex researcher Alfred
Kinsey encouraged photographers to band together to hire a lawyer
to represent them.439 Police again targeted Mizer in 1954, after
newspaper columnist Paul Coates launched a crusade against homo-
sexuality in Los Angeles.440 On his local television program Confi-
dential File, Coates displayed Physique Pictorial and said it was
“thinly veiled pornography” that appealed to sex deviates.441 Police
launched a sting operation to purchase nude photographs in person
and bought some from a Mizer associate.442 Mizer was arrested for
aiding and abetting the sale of lewd photographs.443 He fought the
charge publicly, lambasting it in the pages of his magazine in edito-
rials condemning censorship.444 He was convicted by a local judge
but the case was dismissed on appeal.445
Womack also faced legal pressures soon after he started pub-
lishing physique magazines. In March 1960, a federal jury convicted
Womack on more than two dozen charges of mailing obscenity and
mailing information on where to obtain obscenity, and the U.S.
434. See id. at 25–26.
435. Id. at 26.
436. Id. at 110.
437. Id. at 31.
438. Id. at 34–35.
439. JOHNSON, supra note 413, at 38.
440. Id. at 45.
441. Id. at 44.
442. Id. at 45.
443. Id.
444. Id. at 46.
445. Id.
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Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia upheld the judgement.446
Womack was initially sentenced to one to three years in prison, but
he pleaded insanity.447 A judge sentenced him to spend a year and
a half at a mental hospital, where he was able to continue to run his
growing printing empire.448 “It was very pleasant,” Womack later
said.449 “I had a private room, TV, typewriter. While I was sitting
there I organized Guild book Service.”450
Days after Womack’s conviction on federal obscenity charges,
on March 25, 1960, Post Office officials in Alexandria, Virginia,
seized about 400 copies of the April 1960 issues of MANual, Trim,
and Grecian Guild Pictorial, in parcels bound for Chicago.451 The
magazines each had a monthly circulation of about 25,000 copies,
with about half being distributed through the U.S. mail. Copies sold
for fifty cents each.452
The postmaster in Alexandria described the magazines of con-
sisting “almost exclusively of . . . male models, accompanied by a
brief caption giving the names of the model and the photographer” and
an index of names and addresses of photographers whose photos were
published.453 The magazine’s photographs showed scant evidence of
weight lifting or muscle building, the government said, but rather:
Many of the photographs were of nude male models, usually posed
with some object in front of their genitals; a number were of
nude or partially nude males with emphasis on their bare but-
tocks. Although none of the pictures directly exposed the model’s
genitals, some showed his pubic hair and others suggested what
appeared to be a semi-erect penis; others showed male models
reclining with their legs (and sometimes their arms as well)
spread wide apart. Many of the pictures showed models wearing
only loin cloths, “V gowns”, or posing straps; some showed the
model apparently removing his clothing. Two of the magazines
had pictures of pairs of models posed together suggestively.454
The Alexandria postmaster referred the magazines to the General
Counsel of the Post Office Department, who informed Womack the
magazines were found non-mailable, but whose quantity or monetary
446. Womack v. United States, 294 F.2d 204, 206 (D.C. Cir. 1961).
447. Manual Enterprises, Inc. v. Day, 370 U.S. 478, 528 (1962) (Clark, J., dissenting).
448. Lardner, supra note 421.
449. Id.
450. Id.
451. Manual Enterprises, 370 U.S. at 481.
452. Brief for the Respondent at 70, Manual Enterprises, Inc., 370 U.S. 478 (1962).
453. Id. at 3.
454. Id. at 5–6.
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value did not allow for a formal hearing.455 Womack filed suit in U.S.
District Court seeking an injunction overturning the ban, and a ju-
dicial officer for the Post Office Department commenced a hearing.456
Womack hired lawyer Stanley Dietz to represent him.457
The Post Office department hearing into the mailability of
Womack’s magazines spanned over three days, beginning on April
21, 1960. On two of the days, the testimony ran into the early evenings
well past the usual time of adjournment.458 Three lawyers working
as assistant general counsel for the Post Office, James F. Harding,
Saul Mindel and Richard S. Farr, argued the government’s case.
They relied heavily on expert witnesses who provided testimony
about the negative effects the magazines would have on homosexu-
als.459 In summarizing the experts’ testimony in a later brief, the
government’s lawyers said the experts said the magazines “were
calculated to and would in fact arouse and excite the prurient sexual
interest of . . . practicing homosexuals and to adolescents with latent
homosexual tendencies.”460
[T]he magazines would have a tendency to induce adolescents
with latent homosexual tendencies to engage in overt homosex-
ual activities and become fixed in a pattern of homosexual acts,
and that the excitement the magazines would arouse in both of
these classes of persons would make it more difficult to treat and
cure them.461
The photographs were designed in such ways to appeal to the pruri-
ent interest, the experts said, because “placing an object in front of
the genitals, or otherwise, had a special appeal for male homosexu-
als,” and that depictions of the naked buttocks “would especially
stimulate homosexually inclined males because of its suggestion of
rectal intercourse.”462
Psychiatrist Dr. Frank S. Caprio served as the government’s
first and primary witness.463 He testified that male homosexuals under
his treatment indicated sexual excitement by looking at pictures of
nude males.464 The lawyers asked Caprio about how particular
455. Id. at 3–4.
456. Id. at 4.
457. Id. at 87.
458. Brief for the Respondent, supra note 452, at 86.
459. Id. at 7–8.
460. Id. at 8.
461. Id. at 7.
462. Id. at 8.
463. Transcript of Record at 4, Manual Enterprises, Inc. v. Day, 370 U.S. 478, 528
(1962) (No. 123).
464. Id. at 6.
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photographs in the magazines appeared to pander to homosexual
desires rather than to bodybuilding fans.465 Several times, Dr. Caprio
said it was “ridiculous” to suggest the photos had anything to do
with bodybuilding.466 Instead, they were targeted to appeal to the
particular sexual desires of homosexuals, he said. Pictures of posing
straps are of particular erotic appeal to homosexuals, the doctor tes-
tified, as are photos of nude men wearing shoes. “Many male homo-
sexuals have reported to psychiatrists that the picture of a nude
male wearing shoes gives them added excited and it comes under
the category of fetishism,” Caprio testified.467 Other depictions of
men holding swords hold particular fantasy for homosexual men
who “get sexual excitement [by] feeling that they are overpowered
[when] they are penetrated from behind and many of them have
terrible nightmares feeling that somebody is trying to stab them
with a knife from behind . . . .”468
The magazines have particular danger for adolescent boys who
may have homosexual feelings but become fixated on them because
of the magazines, Caprio testified. Caprio said:
[P]ublications of this kind could very well push them into homo-
sexuality only because mentally they find themselves conscious
of the male body and I think in that respect often it lifts these
young men who are not actually homosexuals but are like this
and out of curiosity they look through magazines of this kind
and before they know it they start masturbating, and instead of
thinking of women when they masturbate they wonder whether
their penis is as big as the penis in these male models and they
develop all kinds of conflicts and they come to us and say, ‘Dr.
Caprio, I don’t feel that maybe I should marry’ and I say why,
and 18 year old boy [says] ‘well I don’t feel that I am developed,
I don’t feel that I am strong. I came across a muscle building
magazine I see some of those men in there and I think they must
have real large penises and do you think I’m a queer?’ ‘What
makes you think you’re queer?’ ‘Well sometimes I am attracted
by these pictures of muscle men I wish I could be like that. I
wish I could have their muscles’ and they start masturbating
with images of the kind of physique that they think they would
like to have. I think in this respect it does tremendous harm and
I question them I say ‘do you buy such magazines?’ and my clinical
experience has been that they do and I tell them in helping them
that their normal sexual adjustment, you have got to stop buying
these magazines, you’ve got to stop looking at these male figures
465. Id. at 5.
466. Id. at 7, 8, and 14.
467. Id. at 7.
468. Id. at 15.
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or the so-called muscle men if you eventually want to make a
good normal sexual adjustment. You can’t masturbate thinking
of a man’s penis and a man’s body and hope to make a normal
sexual adjustment.469
Caprio said his work treating homosexuals shows a relationship
of cause and effect between men viewing nude photos of other men
and then engaging in homosexual activity they may not have done
otherwise.470 He equated this with drug addiction in which the
addict can’t help himself.
These poor fellows can’t help themselves and they take their
money and they send away for these pictures and they mastur-
bate and they go out and drink beer in some tavern and pick up
some fellow and have a homosexual experience and then on
money they send their three dollars or six dollars for more pic-
tures then they masturbate and then they go to the beer tavern
and pick up another fellow or in the park—they send out six
dollars for six more different pictures of different men and this
goes on and on.471
In cross examination, Dietz attempted to get Caprio to describe
the range of things that create sexual excitement, suggesting the
magazines are no more risqué or unusual than a host of other
things.472 After asking several questions about the potential sexual
appeal of photographs to lesbians (why is Playboy acceptable if it
appeals to the prurient interest of lesbians?), the judicial officer
tried to get Dietz move on: “[W]e can’t solve every riddle of human
depravity here today, I don’t think,” he said.473
A second government expert, clinical psychologist Joseph B.
McGovern, testified that the magazines’ audience comprised of ho-
mosexual men who are “likely to have problems as regards [to] their
masculine adequacy.”474 McGovern testified that the magazine had
hallmark characteristics of pornography, rather than artistic or
scientific uses. The magazines present exaggerated photos of men in
various forms of exhibitionism to “provide erotic stimulation.”475
McGovern said the design of the magazines used a “build-up tech-
nique” by using a “series of repetitious stimuli” where photos and
469. Transcript of Record, supra note 463, at 10–11.
470. Id. at 19–20.
471. Id. at 20.
472. Id. at 24.
473. Id. at 30–31.
474. Id. at 33.
475. Transcript of Record, supra note 463, at 39.
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layouts led to a center spread as a “climatic or orgasmic approach.”476
McGovern said this was a “basic technique of pornography.”477
A third government expert, psychiatrist Dr. John Cavanaugh,
did not testify in the interests of time, but both parties stipulated
his testimony would have supported Dr. Caprio’s testimony.478
The defense presented two witnesses to poke holes in the govern-
ment’s case. Child psychiatrist Dr. Michael Miller testified that pho-
tographs do not make heterosexual men turn homosexual. “What
creates the homosexual is an abnormal relationship of the child to
the parent and unbalance there in this relationship and emotional
imbalance which has nothing to do with pictures,” Miller said.479 A
second witness, psychologist Dr. Gordon Link, testified that the mag-
azines would not apply to the prurient interests of “average” readers,
and under questioning from Dietz, acknowledged that small seg-
ments of the population could be aroused by various photos, including
men with “foot fetishism” by looking at photos of women’s shoes in
Ladies’ Home Journal.480
Finally, a postal inspector named Harry J. Simon testified that
that Womack admitted to him during conversations the magazines
were intended for homosexuals.481
Three days after the hearings concluded, Judicial Officer Kelly
issued his written decision finding that the magazines were in fact
obscene because they appealed to the prurient interests of homosex-
uals.482 Kelly dismissed the argument that the magazine must
appeal to the prurient interests of the average reader. “It is the
effect they have upon the audience for whom they are published and
who are interested in them and who would read them that is the
important issue here presented,” Kelly wrote.483 It was clear, Kelly
concluded, the magazines were primarily read by homosexuals for
prurient interests.484 He added that “no amount of literary, scien-
tific, or other material in these issues of the publications . . . would
in any way offset the effect of the main contents of these magazines,
namely, the published photos.”485 Kelly also said the advertising
directory in the magazines allowed readers to purchase additional
476. Id. at 37.
477. Id.
478. Id. at 83.
479. Id. at 41.
480. Id. at 49–50.
481. Transcript of Record, supra note 463, at 53–54.
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nude photographs, including “what is known as hard-core pornogra-
phy in the shape of photographs, sketches, pictures and colored
slides of males engaged in sex acts with each other.”486 With the
photos being declared obscene as well as the advertisements facili-
tating the receipt of additional obscenity, the magazines were cor-
rectly determined to be non-mailable, Kelly concluded.487
Womack filed a lawsuit in federal district court at the same
time he sought a hearing by the judicial officer within the Post Office,
but the case was dismissed without prejudice to give the Post Office
time to conduct a hearing.488 Womack refiled after the Post Office’s
administrative decision was announced.489 U.S. District Court Judge
George L. Hart denied Womack’s motions for a preliminary injunc-
tion and summary judgment on August 17, 1960 without a hearing,
writing in a brief decision that the Post Office’s actions were supported
by substantial evidence and were not arbitrary or capricious.490
Womack appealed to the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia. He lost there, too. On March 23, 1961, a three-judge panel
sided with the government, finding the magazine to be obscene and
the Post Office’s procedures to be appropriate in banning the maga-
zines from the mail.491 In doing so, the Court embraced the legal
argument that the “average person” test from Roth was not the ap-
propriate standard. Judge Bastian wrote:
It seems to us that the real meaning of Roth is that at the object
in question is not to be considered in terms of the reaction of an
isolated atypical consumer . . . The proper test in this case, we
think, is the reaction of the average member of the class for
which the magazines were intended, homosexuals.492
The court emphasized the expert witness testimony from the
Post Office hearing to underscore its conclusions that the magazines
were intended for homosexuals and intended to arouse their pruri-
ent interests.493 Womack’s appeal to the Supreme Court had to feel
like a reach. Indeed, the Supreme Court had rejected his appeal in
Womack v. U.S.494 Nonetheless, Dietz’s eleven-page petition for writ
of certiorari on behalf of Womack presented three questions for the
486. Id. at 84 (emphasis omitted).
487. Transcript of Record, supra note 463, at 87–88.
488. Id. at 81.
489. Id.
490. Id. at 78.
491. Manual Enterprises, Inc. v. Day, 289 F.2d 455, 456 (9th Cir. 1961).
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Court to address.495 First, were the magazines obscene? Under the
Supreme Court’s obscenity standard set forth in Roth, the expres-
sion of ideas that have even the “slightest redeeming social impor-
tance” are constitutionally protected, the petitioners argued.496 “This
Court must conclude that physique magazines, also popularly termed
body building magazines, have significant social importance to a large
segment of the population of the United States,” wrote Womack’s
attorney Stanley Dietz.497 The Court’s precedents in ONE, Sunshine,
and Mounce demonstrate the Court’s insistence on “protecting ideas
contrary to the prevailing climate of public opinion.”498 The petition
argued the “[p]hotographs portrayed in these magazines are not bet-
ter, and no worse than those portrayed in such leading magazines
as Esquire, Gentry, Rogue, Duke, and Playboy magazines which the
Post Office would not dare to argue are obscene.”499 Even the Post
Office Department’s psychiatrist said the photographs “are less re-
vealing than the totally nude photographs which appear in several
issues of ‘Sunshine and Health’ nudist magazine, and other maga-
zines as ‘Playboy,’” the petitioners argued.500
Second, the petitioners asked the Court to review whether the
Post Office procedures effectively acted as an unconstitutional prior
restraint against the magazines.501 The Post Office’s view that it has
the ability to determine whether materials are obscene, based on a
criminal statute that does not specifically grant the Post Office the
right to make an obscenity determination, rests on a “fragile founda-
tion” that “must be kept in mind, both in dealing with the substantive
obscenity question involved and in determining the proper scope of
judicial review,” Dietz wrote.502 The Post Office “conducted an un-
constitutional prior restraint” in this case by first determining the
magazines were non-mailable without notice or a hearing, the pe-
titioners argued.503 The subsequent hearing resulted in “an Order
contrary to the established law,” the petitioners argued.504 “This
amounts to the most obnoxious and unconstitutional censorship,”
Dietz wrote.505
495. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 2, Manual Enterprises, Inc. v. Day, 370 U.S. 478
(1962) (No. 123).
496. Id. at 5–6.
497. Id. at 6.
498. Id.
499. Id.
500. Id. at 4.
501. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 495, at 2.
502. Id. at 7.
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654 WM. & MARY J. RACE, GENDER & SOC. JUST.              [Vol. 26:599
The third question Dietz framed for the Court was really two
questions: whether advertisements informing people where obscene
materials may be obtained are obscene themselves, and second, are
magazines that appeal to the prurient interest of homosexuals pro-
tected by the First Amendment.506 Regarding the advertisements,
Dietz argued that Womack had no knowledge any advertiser was
involved in criminal activity or selling obscene material.507 Dietz
pointed to Smith v. California, in which the Court a year earlier ruled
that a book seller could not be prosecuted for selling a book later de-
termined to be obscene if he had no knowledge as to its contents.508
“[I]t is clear that no publisher is responsible for the unknown ac-
tions of its advertisers any more than any book dealer is responsible
for the content of books for sale from his shelf of which he knows not
the content,” Dietz wrote.509
As to the question about whether the magazines were targeting
homosexuals, and what role, if any, that should play in the legal anal-
ysis, Dietz drew parallels to the ONE case.510 Because the Court’s
decisions in ONE, Sunshine Books and Mounce were one-sentence
opinions, “no one knows” what the Court meant to indicate in over-
turning the obscenity convictions in each case.511 Dietz argued that
the “only reasonable interpretation” of the three decisions was that
the Court “intended that all ideas, containing even the slightest
amount of socially redeeming value, are constitutionally protected,
even though said ideas may be contrary to prevailing public opin-
ion.”512 ONE protected the expression of ideas of homosexuals as a
minority group, Dietz said, and the Court should take Womack’s
case to clarify that indeed, the First Amendment protects the ex-
pression of minority views distasteful to the majority.513
In a brief opposing the writ of certiorari, Solicitor General
Archibald Cox argued that the lower court’s decisions should stand.514
First, Cox said the evidence supported a finding that the magazines
were properly determined to be obscene.515 The magazines’ dominant
themes appealed to the prurient interests of homosexuals, the pho-
tographs sought to stimulate the erotic fantasies of homosexuals,
506. Id. at 2, 8.
507. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 495, at 8.
508. Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 154–55 (1959).
509. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 495, at 8 (citing Smith v. California,
361 U.S. 147 (1959)).
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and the structure of the magazine was intended to have an arousing
effect, Cox wrote.516 He argued that the intended audiences of poten-
tial obscenity are key to legal analysis. “Material which might not
affect the average person may nevertheless be obscene if it is pri-
marily directed to a particularly susceptible audience, such as the
immature, the deviate or the homosexual, for the purpose of satisfy-
ing or stimulating a craving for erotic fantasy,” Cox wrote.517 Even
a “cursory glance” of the magazines shows “they have nothing to do
with bodybuilding,” Cox wrote.518 Second, Cox also argued that the
Post Office procedures in the case, including an expeditious hearing
subject to judicial review, did not amount to an unconstitutional prior
restraint.519 He said the Post Office’s authority to exclude obscene
materials from the mail had long been recognized, and “such an ex-
clusion, if proper, does not violate the First Amendment.”520
The Supreme Court granted certiorari on October 9, 1961. Ac-
cording to Justice Douglas’ docket sheet, five justices voted to hear the
case (Justices Stewart, Brennan, Harlan, Douglas, Black and Warren)
and three justices voted to deny the case (Justices Whittaker, Clark
and Frankfurter).521 Notes and memos reveal that Justices Harlan,
Douglas and Black were viewed as strong votes in favor the maga-
zine: “Justice Harlan would vote to reserve on the ground that the
federal government has no power over sexual morality,” Justice
Warren’s clerk speculated in a memo, while “Justices Black and
Douglas would vote to reverse because no government has the power
to suppress obscenity.”522 Both Justice Brennan and Chief Justice
Warren focused on the administrative procedures and the lack of a
jury trial’s determination of obscenity. “This is a case of prior re-
straint. It is an administrative action barring magazines from the
mails,” Justice Warren wrote on the top of a clerk’s memo that
urged him to take the case.523
Unlike the ONE and Sunshine cases, the Court ordered full
briefing and scheduled oral arguments. Oral arguments spanned
516. Id. at 8.
517. Id. at 11.
518. Id. at 10.
519. Id. at 12.
520. Id.
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two days in late February 1962.524 Never before had homosexuality
been so thoroughly discussed in the chambers of the U.S. Supreme
Court. Stanley Dietz began his oral argument by first emphasizing
the disparity between the current case and the holding in Roth,
hoping to convince justices that the separate focus on the audience
of homosexuals as “second class citizens” would require a new defini-
tion of obscenity and absent that undermines the government’s case.525
“In the Post Office, they have changed this definition” of obscenity
set forth in Roth, Dietz argued.526 By focusing on the prurient inter-
est of homosexuals as a new legal standard, the Post Office has also
inadvertently raised some other questions. “Just what is this so-
called homosexual audience? What are they composed of?” Dietz
asked.527 He said the term homosexual “does not describe people”
but rather “describes things that people do.”528 To underscore the
different standard advocated by the government, Dietz pointed to
nude calendars of Marilyn Monroe “on walls all over the country.”529
Dietz said the photographs in the magazines are certainly no more
provocative than the Monroe pin-ups. “[I]f we so-called normal
people, according to our law, are entitled to have our pin-ups then
why shouldn’t the second class citizens, the homosexual group, if
you use that term, why shouldn’t they be allowed to have their pin-
up? Their pin-up is certainly no worse.”530 Next, Dietz defended
Womack’s actions regarding the advertisements, saying that he did
everything reasonable to delete advertisers from subsequent issues
once he learned they were selling “non-mailable” photographs, in-
cluding ones of nude men.531 Third, Dietz emphasized the prior
restraint aspects of the Post Office’s administrative procedures.532
He walked the Court through the timeline of the magazines’ sei-
zures, the Post Office’s notification, the filing of a lawsuit, and the
scheduling of administrative hearings.533 The procedures themselves
can serve as an effective prior restraint for a monthly periodical that
depends on the mail for readers.
[I]f they can take a magazine keep it for 10 to 12 days before they
are supposed to send you a letter saying that you’re not going to
524. Oral Argument (Feb. 26–27, 1962), Manual Enterprises, Inc. v. Day, 370 U.S. 478
(1962) (No. 123), https://www.oyez.org/cases/1961/123 [https://perma.cc/YBG7-5B3R].
525. Id. at 07:30.
526. Id. at 09:09.
527. Id. at 05:51.
528. Id. at 06:16.
529. Id. at 15:21.
530. Oral Argument, supra note 524, at 16:20.
531. Id. at 17:30.
532. Id. at 20:31.
533. Id. at 20:58.
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be able to continue through the mails with this magazine before
they even start in, the mechanism for having a hearing then by the
time, this hearing is finally granted, if ever, your magazines are
no longer saleable because the month has passed.534
J. William Doolittle, Jr. argued the government’s case.535 He
said the “unusual type of publication” at the center of the case is a
“peculiarly insidious form of obscenity”—he also called it “hardcore
pornography”—because of its covert impact on its target audience
of “male homosexuals to whom the clothing, settings and props had
symbolic meaning.”536
The justices asked several questions of both lawyers. For exam-
ple, several justices asked about the timing of the magazine’s sei-
zures and Womack’s earlier conviction, wondering if he was being
targeted by authorities. Others asked about the appropriateness of
expert witnesses on the question of whether materials are obscene.
Others zeroed in on Doolittle’s emphasis on the magazine’s audi-
ence, getting him to admit that had the magazines been sent to the
Kinsey institute or “colleges,” they likely would have not been seized
by the Post Office.537
Several soliloquies between the justices and lawyers focused on
the extent to which Womack admitted the audience was homosexuals
and even engaged in significant back and forth about Womack’s en-
joyment of baiting postal inspectors in banter.538 Chief Justice Warren
asked Dietz directly, “Have you conceded or was it conceded—in this
case that these magazines were beamed toward homosexuals?”539
Deitz replied, “Never your honor.”540 He explained, “These magazines
are sold to newsstands and no one really knows who the purchasers
might be and there is over 40,000 of them sold a month.”541
In another back and forth between Warren and Dietz, Dietz
acknowledged that a letter Womack sent to a photographer wanting
a “truck driver type, it’s all showered up, clean and ready for bed,”
was an allusion to a model attractive to homosexuals.542 “What is your
explanation of that letter, what does that letter indicate to you?”
Chief Justice Warren probed. “What kind of viewer?” he asked.543
534. Id. at 24:13.
535. Id. at 40:28.
536. Oral Argument, supra note 524, at 40:42.
537. Id. at 32:49.
538. Id. at 34:30.
539. Id. at 40:47.
540. Id. at 40:56.
541. Id. at 41:57.
542. Oral Argument, supra note 524, at 49:05.
543. Id. at 49:48.
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Warren asked,”You don’t think this letter implies . . . this is to go . . .
[to] the homosexual?” and Dietz responded:
Let’s say that it was intended to get this photograph for use to
appeal to a homosexual. . . . [E]ven if these magazines are
beamed . . . at homosexuals, if there’s such a thing as a class of
people named homosexuals, if these magazines are beamed off,
then what does this One, Inc. vs. Olesen case stand for? Are ho-
mosexuals allowed to receive the pick-ups or literature that they
may chose to purchase, or are they to be censored out of that be-
cause, we, as so-called normal people, don’t like homosexuals.544
The oral arguments ended with a litany of questions to Dietz as he
tried to answer them all. “I think we better get to rest,” Justice
Warren said as he wrapped up the second day of arguments.545 “I
know I have gone over my time, so I want to thank you. I also didn’t
finish half the things I wanted to say,” Dietz said, to which Chief
Justice Warren responded, “I’m sure of that.”546
The week after oral arguments, the justices met in conference
to discuss the case on March 2, 1962.547 The Supreme Court issued
its decision on June 25, 1962.548 The vote was 6–1, but the rationales
varied. Justice Harlan wrote the majority opinion, joined only by
Justice Stewart.549 Justice Brennan wrote a concurring opinion,
joined by Justices Warren and Douglas.550 Justice Black concurred
with the result.551 Justice Clark dissented. Justices Frankfurter and
White took no part in the decision.552
In the majority opinion, Justice Harlan stipulated at the begin-
ning, in seemingly damning terms to Womack, that it believed the
magazines were not bodybuilding publications appealing to the
ordinary male adult but were in fact magazines composed primarily
to appeal to the prurient interest of “sexual deviates” and have no
literary, scientific or other merit.553 And the decision concluded with
an ominous admonition that “nothing in this opinion of course
remotely implies approval of the type of magazine published by
these petitioners, still less of the sordid motives which prompted
544. Id. at 50:04.
545. Id. at 1:05:41.
546. Id. at 01:05:49.
547. MURDOCH & PRICE, supra note 75, at 75.
548. Manual Enterprises, Inc. v. Day, 370 U.S. 478 (1962).
549. Id. at 479.
550. Id. at 495 (Brennan, J., concurring).
551. Id. at 519 (Clark, J., dissenting).
552. Id. at 495.
553. Id. at 481.
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their publication.”554 It was if the Supreme Court had to reinforce
what already was a overwhelmingly dominant viewpoint of condem-
nation of homosexuality.
Despite those denunciations of homosexuality at the beginning
and the end, Justice Harlan hung his analysis on whether the
magazines were obscene on the question of their “patent offensive-
ness.”555 A determination of obscenity under the federal statute
requires not only that the material pander to prurient interests, but
it also must be patently offensive, Justice Harlan wrote.556 While the
prurient interest standard was the focus of most of the litigation, in
part because of its emphasis in the Roth decision, the lower courts
failed to establish the magazines were also patently offensive.557
Justice Harlan referenced the intent and history of the federal statute.
In using the words “obscene, lewd, lascivious, indecent, filthy or vile,”
the federal statute prohibited materials that are “so offensive as to
make it unacceptable under current community mores,” Justice
Harlan wrote.558 He said the statute’s history shows it was aimed at
“obnoxiously debasing portrayals of sex.”559 In most obscenity cases,
the two elements of patent offensiveness and prurient interest appeal
“tend to coalesce,” he wrote.560 “It is only in the unusual instance
where, as here, the ‘prurient interest’ appeal of the material is found
limited to a particular class of persons that occasion arises for a
truly independent inquiry into the question whether or not the
material is patently offensive.”561 The distinction between these two
elements was glossed over in the court proceedings below, Harlan
wrote.562 “These magazines cannot be deemed so offensive on their
face as to affront current community standards of decency,” the Court
wrote.563 “Lacking that quality, the magazines cannot be deemed
legally ‘obscene.’”564
Justice Harlan did not articulate a clear test for when materials
meet the patent offensiveness threshold, suggesting that “whether
‘hard-core’ pornography, or something less, be the proper test” is not
the question before the Court.565 But based on the Court’s “own
554. Manual Enterprises, 370 U.S. at 495.
555. Id. at 482.
556. Id. at 486.
557. Id. at 482–83.
558. Id. at 482.
559. Manual Enterprises, 370 U.S. at 483.
560. Id. at 486.
561. Id. at 486.
562. Id. at 482.
563. Id. at 482.
564. Id. at 482.
565. Manual Enterprises, 370 U.S. at 489.
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independent examination of the magazines,” Justice Harlan wrote,
“the most that can be said of them is that they are dismally unpleas-
ant, uncouth, and tawdry. But this is not enough to make them
‘obscene.’”566 He also said the photographs cannot be fairly distin-
guished from equivalent depictions of women that society tolerates.567
After determining the magazines lacked the requisite patent
offensiveness to be deemed legally obscene, Justice Harlan turned
to the question of the advertisements. Based both on criminal law
standards and the precedent in Smith v. California, Justice Harlan
said the government was required to prove to some degree that
Womack had knowledge the advertisers were selling legally obscene
material in order for his magazines to be banned from the mail.568
“At best the Government’s proof showed no more than that petition-
ers were chargeable with knowledge that these advertisers were
offering photographs of the same character, and with the same
purposes, as those reflected in their own magazines,” Justice Harlan
wrote.569 The Court said the burdens on publishers would be too
great if they were required to police the details of every advertiser’s
business practices, and there was no evidence Womack was aware
that clearly obscene materials were be sold through the advertise-
ments in his magazines.570
Justice Brennan wrote a lengthy concurring opinion, joined by
Chief Justice Warren and Justice Douglas.571 Brennan focused on
the statutory and constitutional limits of the Post Office Depart-
ment’s ability to withhold materials from the mail.572 Brennan said
it was important for the Court to pay attention to both the stan-
dards for obscenity determinations, as well as the procedures used
by the government to make and carry out those determinations.573
“We risk erosion of First Amendment liberties unless we train our
vigilance upon the methods whereby obscenity is condemned no less
than upon the standards whereby it is judged,” Brennan wrote.574
After discussing the history of Section 1461 and the Post Office’s
administrative procedures, Brennan concluded that the Post Office
did not have independent authority under the statute to make de-
terminations of whether materials are obscene.575
566. Id. at 489–90.
567. Id.
568. Id. at 492.
569. Id. at 494–95.
570. Id.
571. Manual Enterprises, 370 U.S. at 498.
572. Id. at 500–16.
573. Id. at 503, 518–19.
574. Id. at 497.
575. Id. at 519.
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Justice Clark wrote a strong dissenting opinion, saying the
majority and concurrence “requires the United States Post Office to
be the world’s largest disseminator of smut and Grand Informer of
the names and places where obscene material may be obtained.”576
Justice Clark would have upheld the lower court’s decision on the
basis that the statute requires the Post Office to reject obscene ma-
terial, and the magazines in question clearly contain information on
where to obtain obscene material.577
While Womack won his landmark obscenity case before the U.S.
Supreme Court in 1962, winning there was not the happy ending to
his career as a publisher. A subsequent obscenity conviction in 1971
ultimately sent him to jail, nearly bankrupted him and shut down
his businesses.578 Womack has been heralded as “an unsung anti-
hero of the gay liberation movement.”579 “I honestly believe if I do
anything to advance the freedom of the press, I’ll consider myself
lucky. But if homosexuals want a literature, they have a right to it.
They pay taxes and die,” Womack told a reporter in 1970.580 Womack
died in 1985 at the age of 62.581
III. IMPLICATIONS
In 2019, reflecting on the fiftieth anniversary of the 1969 Stone-
wall riots that mark the birth of the modern American gay rights
movement, the gay conservative writer Andrew Sullivan noted “[t]here
has never been a better time or place in the history of the world to
be gay than in 2019 and in the West.”582 The remarkable “gay revolu-
tion” in media, business, politics and law has ushered in an unprece-
dented era of equality for millions of LGBT Americans.583 Perhaps
drawing on Martin Luther King’s observation that “the arc of the
moral universe is long but it bends towards justice,”584 Sullivan
576. Id.
577. Manual Enterprises, 370 U.S. at 520.
578. Lardner, supra note 421.
579. MURDOCH & PRICE, supra note 75, at 68 (quoting Cornell University historian
Jackie Hatton).
580. Dr. Herman Lynn Womack: First Amendment Pioneer, RAINBOW HISTORY PROJECT
DIGITAL COLLECTIONS, https://archives.rainbowhistory.org/exhibits/show/Womack/pioneer
/womack_intro [https://perma.cc/9ZZ2-T8S4] (quoting the WASH. DAILY NEWS, April 30,
1970).
581. Streitmatter & Watson, supra note 413, at 64.
582. Andrew Sullivan, The Next Step for Gay Pride, N.Y. MAG. (June 21, 2019), http://
nymag.com/intelligencer/2019/06/andrew-sullivan-the-next-step-for-gay-pride.html
[https://perma.cc/WJH6-C5SM].
583. See generally LILLIAN FADERMAN, THE GAY REVOLUTION: THE STORY OF THE
STRUGGLE (2015); LINDA HIRSHMAN, VICTORY: THE TRIUMPHANT GAY REVOLUTION (2012).
584. Chris Hayes, The Moral Universe Does Not Inherently Bend Towards Justice,
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described recent LGBT history as “the long night of persecution [giv-
ing] way to the dawning of integration.”585 Lawyer and writer Walter
Frank used similar language to describe the history of the American
LGBT rights movement as having two phases: “the first being a fight
for freedom from oppression, the second being a fight for full inte-
gration into society.”586
A fuller understanding of the foundations of “gaylaw” is important
because legal protections for homosexuals are a new phenomenon
in the United States, at least historically speaking. They remain
hotly contested in theory and practice, with political conservatives
accusing justices who have expanded legal protections to gays and
lesbians as being judicial activists inserting their own policy wishes
over the will of voters. Historically speaking, it is hard to argue with
dissenting justices when they note that gay marriage is hardly a
tradition in American history—or any history for that matter. Indeed,
the U.S. Supreme Court in 1972 rejected an appeal from two men in
Minnesota seeking the right to marry each other. In a one sentence
order, the Court wrote, “appeal . . . dismissed for want of substantial
federal question.”587
It was only seventy years ago when homosexuals were such a
despised minority that the mere communication among them was
subject to punishment and suppression.588 In the 1950s and 1960s,
the government instituted a multifaceted approach to shut down
communications networks for homosexuals to suppress and punish
homosexuals and their perceived threat to public morality.589
By overturning government censorship in the three cases exam-
ined in this Article, the Supreme Court made it more difficult for the
government to contain a fledging homophile movement from growing.
In the 1960s and 1970s, LGBT-themed publications found new mar-
kets, thanks in part to the precedents in One, Inc., Sunshine Book Co.,
and Manual Enterprises that emboldened publishers to produce and
disseminate materials and provide legal markets to reach consum-
ers.590 While One, Inc. was grounded in more political expression,
Sunshine Book Co. and Manual Enterprises clearly opened the door to
NBC NEWS (Mar. 24, 2018, 8:02 AM), https://www.nbcnews.com/think/opinion/idea-moral
-universe-inherently-bends-towards-justice-inspiring-it-s-ncna859661 [https://perma.cc
/76G7-FV4S].
585. Sullivan, supra note 582.
586. WALTER FRANK, LAW AND THE GAY RIGHTS STORY: THE LONG SEARCH FOR EQUAL
JUSTICE IN A DIVIDED DEMOCRACY 208 (2014).
587. Baker v. Nelson, 409 U.S. 810 (1972).
588. Ball, Obscenity, supra note 9, at 231–33.
589. Id. at 264–65.
590. Id. at 232, 290.
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more sexually explicit publications for sexual minorities.591 Both gen-
res found new audiences through new modes of mass communication,
connecting homophiles to others like them in ways not seen before.
Scholar Carlos Ball persuasively argues that the One, Inc. and
Manual Enterprises cases represent the Supreme Court’s “moral
displacement” within obscenity law.592 While the courts regularly de-
meaned homosexuality well after this era, these two decisions re-
flected an uneasiness with treating homosexuals as second-class
citizens based on the government’s interest in public morality that
ultimately made the courts more sympathetic to claims of animus
that inform LGBT law.
Indeed, the loosening of obscenity law in the 1950s and 1960s
was among the first of several important First Amendment issues
that helped homosexuals organize a broader social movement. Ob-
scenity regulations threatened the very existence of homosexual
communication, both in terms of sexual expression and the gay press,
both of which allowed individuals to develop a “gay identity” and pro-
vided a framework for a gay community and subculture.593 That these
decisions came as the Supreme Court was struggling to define the
obscene is important. John D’Emilio has argued, “Much of the gay
and lesbian literature and a good deal of the queer press of the post-
Stonewall decades would not have passed muster under the obscenity
standards of the pre-Roth era. It would be impossible to overstate
how important these rulings on obscenity were.”594
The First Amendment provided additional helpful legal rights
for LGBT citizens during the homophile and gay liberation eras, in-
cluding in access to public forums, freedom of association, and speech
rights in context of employment discrimination.595 First Amendment
jurisprudence became a battleground over the right of homophiles
to wear gender-nonconforming clothes, perform in live theater, ad-
vertise in the yellow pages of phone books, associate in and operate
gay bars, form corporations, organize student groups and take out
ads in school newspapers, and “come out” without being fired from
their jobs.596
591. Id. at 232, 291–93.
592. BALL, THE FIRST AMENDMENT, supra note 9, at 16.
593. Depictions of homosexuality were banned by movie production codes. Gay themes
on broadcast media were more likely to be found “indecent” and received heightened scru-
tiny by the Federal Communications Commission. See, for example, In re Pacifica Found.
Inc., 2 FCC Rcd. 2698 (1987) (finding excerpts of an AIDS-related drama broadcast over
radio to violate the prohibition against indecency, and opining that these excerpts also
constitute obscenity).
594. John D’Emilio, Some Lessons from Lawrence, in THE FUTURE OF GAY RIGHTS IN
AMERICA 10 (2006).
595. See Siegel, supra note 9, at 225–45.
596. Id.
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The 1950s and 1960s was a period of particularly repressive gov-
ernment actions that gave rise to a fledging opposition movement
among homosexuals who began to identify and organize.597 It was
through contesting the political, legal and cultural aspects of the
“Lavender Scare” during the 1950s that homophiles began to develop
notions of community and subculture that fueled the “gay liberation
era” of the 1970s and 1980s, when activists fought for visibility and
tolerance.598 The 1990s and early 2000s gave rise to the “gay rights
era,” characterized by growing acceptance in public opinion and by
lawmakers. The success of the gay marriage movement suggests a
break to a “gay equality era.”
Many factors have contributed to the LGBT movement’s suc-
cesses, including the uses of mass communication to connect individ-
uals to a subculture and gain tolerance by changing public opinion
through media representations. The expansion of legal rights was also
crucial to the LGBT movement. Most major political and moral issues
in America eventually make their way to the courts and seek a
resolution as a matter of constitutional law. As a matter of modern
American constitutional law, legal equality for gays and lesbians is
the byproduct of three U.S. Supreme Court decisions: Romer v. Evans
(1996),599 Lawrence v. Texas (2003)600 and Obergefell v. Hodges
(2015).601 Two other marriage equality decisions, Hollingsworth v.
Perry (2012)602 and United States v. Windsor (2013),603 were decided
on narrower grounds. Scholars, journalists and lawyers have her-
alded each of these cases as landmark Supreme Court decisions.604
In Romer v. Evans, the Court ruled that the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protected homosexuals from be-
ing singled out for exclusion under antidiscrimination laws.605 In 1992,
voters in Colorado approved “Amendment 2” by voter referendum.606
The law banned municipalities from including sexual orientation as
597. JOHNSON, supra note 413, at 1–14.
598. Id. at 9–10.
599. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
600. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
601. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
602. Hollingsworth v. Perry, 568 U.S. 1066 (2013).
603. United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744 (2013).
604. For narrative accounts of these cases, see SUSAN BERRY CASEY, APPEALING FOR
JUSTICE: ONE LAWYER, FOUR DECADES AND THE LANDMARK GAY RIGHTS CASE: ROMER V.
EVANS (2016); DALE CARPENTER, FLAGRANT CONDUCT: THE STORY OF LAWRENCE V. TEXAS
(2012); DAVID BOIES & THEODORE B. OLSON, REDEEMING THE DREAM: THE CASE FOR MAR-
RIAGE EQUALITY (2014); JO BECKER, FORCING THE SPRING: INSIDE THE FIGHT FOR MARRIAGE
EQUALITY (2014); KENJI YOSHINO, SPEAK NOW: MARRIAGE EQUALITY ON TRIAL (2015);
ROBERTA KAPLAN, THEN COMES MARRIAGE: UNITED STATES V. WINDSOR AND THE DEFEAT
OF DOMA (2015).
605. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 635–36 (1996).
606. Id. at 623–25.
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a protected class in antidiscrimination laws and rescinded protections
already in place in some cities.607 Justice Kennedy for the Court’s
6–3 majority said the Constitution requires “the law’s neutrality
where the rights of persons are at stake,” citing Justice Harlan’s dis-
sent in Plessy v. Ferguson, a discredited precedent that upheld the
“separate but equal” doctrine allowing discrimination against Afri-
can Americans based on race.608 The Court’s majority found the law
to be motivated by anti-gay “animus.”609 The majority wrote, “A law
declaring that in general it shall be more difficult for one group of
citizens than for all others to seek aid from the government is itself
a denial of equal protection of the laws in the most literal sense.”610
Applying the Court’s equal protection framework of analysis, the
majority determined the law lacked even a rational basis to advance
legitimate state interests.611 “We must conclude that Amendment 2
classifies homosexuals not to further a proper legislative end but to
make them unequal to everyone else. This Colorado cannot do. A State
cannot so deem a class of persons a stranger to its laws.”612
In Lawrence v. Texas, the Court struck down Texas’ “homosexual
conduct” law and ruled the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment prohibits the government from criminalizing consen-
sual sexual activity between same-sex adults in a private home.613
Justice Kennedy’s analysis established that the liberty interests
protected by the Due Process Clause includes the right of individu-
als to make decisions about personal relationships and intimate
conduct in their private lives. “When sexuality finds overt expres-
sion in intimate conduct with another person, the conduct can be but
one element in a personal bond that is more enduring. The liberty
protected by the Constitution allows homosexual persons the right
to make this choice,” Justice Kennedy wrote for the 6–3 majority.614
The majority said that the Texas statute furthered “no legitimate
state interest which can justify its intrusion into the personal and
private life of the individual.”615 In doing so, the Court overturned
its 1986 decision in Bowers v. Hardwick, a landmark precedent that
for the previous generation justified disparate legal treatment for
607. Id.
608. Id. at 623.
609. Id. at 632.
610. Id. at 633.
611. Romer, 517 U.S. at 632.
612. Id. at 635.
613. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 564 (2003).
614. Id. at 579. Justice O’Connor joined in the judgment but would have decided the
case on equal protection grounds and not overturned Bowers. Id. at 579–85.
615. Id. at 578.
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homosexuals. Bowers’ “continuance as precedent demeans the lives
of homosexual persons,” Justice Kennedy wrote.616 While the Bowers
majority rooted their decision in historical notions of moral disap-
proval of homosexual conduct, Justice Kennedy wrote, the key issue
“is whether the majority may use the power of the State to enforce
these views on the whole society through operation of the criminal
law.”617 The answer, the majority determined, was no. Citing another
precedent, the Court wrote, “Our obligation is to define the liberty
of all, not to mandate our own moral code.”618 He said the authors of
the Fourteenth Amendment could have been more specific in their
notions of liberty they sought to protect, but they did not enumerate
its limits. Justice Kennedy wrote, “They knew times can blind us to
certain truths and later generations can see that laws once thought
necessary and proper in fact serve only to oppress. As the Constitu-
tion endures, persons in every generation can invoke its principles
in their own search for greater freedom.”619
In Obergefell v. Hodges, the Court ruled that marriage was a
fundamental right of citizens, and both the Due Process Clause and
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohib-
ited the government from denying citizens the right to marry a
person of the same sex.620 The decision was a culmination of several
cases percolating in the lower courts and two other Supreme Court
decisions favoring gay marriage, albeit on narrower grounds.621 In
Obergefell, the majority ruled marriage is a fundamental right under
the Constitution that applies to same-sex couples as it does to op-
posite sex couples.622 The right to marriage is a fundamental right
rooted in the right to personal choice based on individual autonomy
and the right to intimate association, and it serves important gov-
ernment interests in the safeguarding of family and in marriage’s
service to social order, the majority ruled. “The Constitution promises
liberty to all within its reach, a liberty that includes certain specific
rights that allow persons, within a lawful realm, to define and ex-
press their identity,” Justice Kennedy wrote.623
616. Id. at 523.
617. Id. at 571.
618. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 571 (quoting Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v.
Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 850 (1992)).
619. Id. at 579.
620. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2652 (2015).
621. United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744 (2013) (striking down the federal Defense
of Marriage Act); Hollingsworth v. Perry, 570 U.S. 693 (2013) (upholding lower court
decision that Prop 8 in California violated equal protection).
622. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2593–608.
623. Id.
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Each decision had one thing in common: they were authored by
Justice Kennedy, often described as the “swing” justice during his
thirty years on the Court. As a result, Justice Kennedy has been called
the “Thurgood Marshall of gay rights.”624 Each decision had some-
thing else in common: they came from a deeply divided Court, and
their precedential power is already under scrutiny following Justice
Kennedy’s retirement in 2018.625
Each of Justice Kennedy’s decisions met stark dissents at the
time. In Romer, Justice Scalia said in his dissent that Colorado voters
sought to “preserve traditional sexual mores against the efforts of
a politically powerful minority.”626 He criticized as elitist the sugges-
tion that moral disapproval of homosexuality was wrong.627 “I had
thought that one could consider certain conduct reprehensible—
murder, for example, or polygamy, or cruelty to animals—and could
exhibit even ‘animus’ toward such conduct. Surely that is the only
sort of ‘animus’ at issue here.”628 In dissent in Lawrence, Justice
Scalia went further, accusing his brethren of embracing the “so-
called homosexual agenda,” in which “some homosexual activists” seek
to eliminate “the moral opprobrium that has traditionally attached
to homosexual conduct.”629 He said many Americans believe the
homosexual “lifestyle” to be “immoral and destructive,” and they do
not want homosexuals as partners in their businesses or teachers in
their children’s schools.630 The Court, he said, “has taken sides in the
culture war, departing from its role of assuring, as neutral observer,
that the democratic rules of engagement are observed.”631 Justice
Scalia said the decision framed the overruling of Bowers as inconsis-
tent with the Court’s application of stare decisis in abortion cases,
also rooted in liberty and privacy interests. He called the decision a
“massive disruption of the current social order” and mocked its basis
624. Jennifer Senior, In Conversation: Antonin Scalia, N.Y. MAG. (Oct. 4, 2013), http://
nymag.com/news/features/antonin-scalia-2013-10/index3.html [https://perma.cc/6Y69
-YRXR].
625. Matthew R. Grothouse, Implicit in the Concept of Ordered Liberty: How Obergefell
v. Hodges Illuminates the Modern Substantive Due Process Debate, 49 J. MARSHALL L.
REV. 1021 (2016) (arguing that Obergefell provides a workable framework for “recognition
and protection of new rights while preserving the judicial restraint and analytical objec-
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in the right to liberty.632 Texas’ homosexual conduct law “undoubtedly
imposes constraints on liberty. So do laws prohibiting prostitution,
recreational use of heroin, and for that matter, working more than
60 hours per week in a bakery. But there is no right to ‘liberty’ under
the Due Process Clause,” Justice Scalia wrote.633 Justice Scalia said
criminal laws against “fornication, bigamy, adultery, adult incest,
bestiality, and obscenity” are all inconsistent with the majority’s
analysis.634 “This effectively decrees the end of all morals legislation.
If, as the Court asserts, the promotion of majoritarian sexual morality
is not even a legitimate state interest, none of the above-mentioned
laws can survive rational-basis review.”635
In Obergefell, Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Scalia, Thomas
and Alito wrote scathing dissents attacking the foundations of the
majority ruling. Chief Justice Roberts accused the majority of sup-
planting its policy choices for constitutional rule-making. “The right
it announces has no basis in the Constitution or this Court’s prece-
dent,” he wrote.636 By invalidating marriage laws and ordering “the
transformation of a social institution that has formed the basis of
human society for millennia,” Chief Justice Roberts asked his breth-
ren, “Just who do we think we are?”637 Chief Justice Roberts in
Obergefell said the majority’s “aggressive application of substantive
due process breaks sharply with decades of precedent and returns
the Court to the unprincipled approach of Lochner.”638 Justice Scalia
joined Chief Justice Roberts’ dissent in full, but wrote a separate
dissent to emphasize what he called “this Court’s threat to Ameri-
can democracy.”639 Justice Scalia said the decision was the “furthest
extension” of the “Court’s claimed power to create ‘liberties’ that the
Constitution and its Amendments neglect to mention.”640 His per-
sonal attacks on the majority were striking, peppered with charac-
terizations as “pretentious” and “egotistic,” and “hubris.”641 Justice
Scalia wrote. “The world does not expect logic and precision in poetry
or inspirational pop-philosophy; it demands them in the law. The
stuff contained in today’s opinion has to diminish this Court’s repu-
tation for clear thinking and sober analysis.”642 Justices Thomas and
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Alito in separate dissents raised similar objections, critiquing the
Court’s broader substantive due process jurisprudence and its rejec-
tion of traditions.643
The Court’s decisions in Romer, Lawrence and Obergefell create
the foundations of constitutional rights of modern “gaylaw,” but the
strength of the foundations will be tested in future cases by a Court
without Justice Kennedy.644 Will a more politically conservative Court
restrict or overturn Justice Kennedy’s expansive view of liberty and
equality rights embodied in these cases? How a Court without Jus-
tice Kennedy will address gay rights cases likely to reach the Court
in coming years?645
The courts are likely to enter a new phase of gay rights juris-
prudence partly because of Justice Kennedy’s retirement. At least
two LGBT rights cases are likely to appear before the Court in
coming terms. In 2018, the Court declined to issue a broad ruling in
a closely watched case pitting religious freedom rights against state
antidiscrimination laws. The case, Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v.
Colorado Civil Rights Commission, raised the question of whether
a bakery could refuse to make a wedding cake for a same-sex couple
based on the baker’s First Amendment rights to free speech and free
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and defending substantive due process in the context of fundamental rights); Kenji
Yoshino, A New Birth of Freedom?: Obergefell v. Hodges, 147 HARV. L. REV. 129 (2015)
(calling Obergefell a “game changer for substantive due process jurisprudence” by inter-
twining liberty and equality in its analysis).
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exercise of religion.646 The Court narrowly ruled that Colorado failed
to provide religious neutrality in its administrative proceedings,647 but
either the case on remand or a case raising similar issues may well
reach the Court again soon. In 2019, the Court agreed to review three
appellate cases648 that split on the question of whether discrimina-
tion based on sexual orientation and gender identity constitute dis-
crimination based on sex and thus prohibited in the workplace under
federal law.649
CONCLUSION
The First Amendment’s centrality to LGBT rights ideology and
its importance in the development of protective legal doctrine is an
important component of LGBT history. In three important cases
between 1958 and 1962, the Supreme Court codified the significance
of the First Amendment as critical tool for social justice for LGBT ad-
vocates. One, Inc. v. Oleson required the Supreme Court to decide
whether a magazine that discussed homosexual topics was obscene
simply by virtue of discussing homosexuality, and Manual Enter-
prises, Inc. v. Day asked whether physique magazines were akin to
hardcore pornography.650 The cases—the first Supreme Court cases
dealing with questions of homosexuality—established the precedent
that homosexual communication was to be treated by the same stan-
dards as other forms of communication, under the First Amendment.
The homosexuals got some help from nudists, a different breed of
sexual minorities who faced similar censorship in Sunshine Book Co.
v. Summerfield but whose heteronormative views may have been more
sympathetic to judges of the era. While the Stonewall riots of 1969
mark the start of the “gay liberation” era—defined by increased
organizing and activism of homosexuals—this Article shows that in
the “homophile era” of the preceding two decades, homosexuals used
the First Amendment to establish the right of public magazines to
exist in the public sphere, demonstrating the importance of tradi-
tional First Amendment theories and doctrines as instrumental in
allowing LGBT citizens to identify with and create a subculture and
social movement.
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